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COMMENT 
SMART CONTRACTS AND THE COST OF INFLEXIBILITY 
JEREMY M. SKLAROFF† 
“Smart contracts” are decentralized agreements built in computer code and stored 
on a blockchain. Proponents imagine a future where commerce takes place exclusively 
using smart contracts, avoiding the high costs of contract drafting, judicial intervention, 
opportunistic behavior, and the inherent ambiguities of written language. 
These decentralized code-only contracts are part of a decades-long quest to 
eliminate supposed inefficiencies in traditional written agreements. Electronic data 
interchange (EDI), a contracting technology from the 1970s, was designed with the 
same goal and garnered similar fanfare. Commentators at the time imagined a 
revolution in the way firms transacted and a full shift away from anything resembling 
a paper contract. Ultimately EDI failed to achieve these goals—it empowered, rather 
than circumvented, human decisionmakers along with their “inefficient” way of 
forming agreements. In doing so, EDI successfully reduced some transaction costs 
while preserving efficient forms of contractual flexibility. 
Smart contracts are indeed more technologically sophisticated than EDI. Smart 
contract scripting languages offer a broader range of operations and greater scalability. 
Smart contracts are capable of seamlessly integrating with the operational and 
financial systems at the core of modern firms, whereas EDI transactions occurred in 
very early digital environments that required human intermediaries. Proponents of 
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the smart contract revolution, therefore, do not describe the technology as a way to 
merely enhance human activity; they argue it can replace every stage of agreement 
formation and performance. From a purely technical standpoint, they might be right. 
However, shifting away from human-language contracts creates new 
inefficiencies. These stem from three features of smart contracts: automation, which 
requires that every agreement be formed from fully-defined terms; decentralization, 
which conditions performance on verification by third parties; and anonymity, which 
eliminates the use of commercial context to give meaning to agreement terms. As a 
result, it is extremely costly to form smart contracts in a volatile environment or 
whenever there’s a level of uncertainty surrounding the agreement. 
On the other hand, semantic contracts are flexible. They enable parties to use 
performance standards, generally-defined contract terms, to create an enforceable 
agreement without requiring complete knowledge of what might happen in the future. 
Standards also allow parties to responsively incorporate commercial customs into their 
agreement, circumventing the need for explicit but redundant negotiation. And once 
their agreement is formed and executed, the parties are nonetheless free to 
dynamically shape their relationship through informal modifications or by selectively 
enforcing breaches. These two forms of flexibility—linguistic ambiguity, and 
enforcement discretion—create important efficiencies in the contracting process. By 
eliminating this flexibility, smart contracting will impose costs that are more severe 
and intractable than the ones it seeks to solve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Technology promises to replace slow and imprecise paper institutions 
with efficient, digitized counterparts.1 Contract law is a frequent target of 
these hopes.2 Though contracts ostensibly provide relief from the 
inefficiencies of public law, creating stable and predictable rules with which 
parties can privately order their affairs, many claim that contract law is 
broken, and sorely in need of a “killer app.” 
Such criticisms come from the academy and from practitioners alike. 
Scholars criticize the inconsistency of judicial contract interpretation and the 
unpredictability of remedies in cases of breach.3 Even more severe criticisms 
come from commerce and industry, the private parties for whom contracts are 
explicitly supposed to be efficiency-enhancing. They view contract drafting as 
being dominated by arbitrary complexity, empowering lawyers to sap 
businesses of time and money.4 Some of the most ferocious criticism comes 
from technology entrepreneurship, where time and money are both especially 
 
1 See Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, 6 SCI. AS CULTURE 44, 44 
(1996) (“Information technologies, so the argument goes, empower the individual, enhance personal 
freedom, and radically reduce the power of the nation-state. Existing social, political and legal power 
structures will wither away . . . .”). 
2 See Harry Surden, Computable Contract, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 629, 631-35 (2012) (noting that 
firms have designed technological solutions to manage the high cost of designing, implementing, and 
litigating contracts); Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, 
FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1997), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/ED3B-
646Z] (proposing the concept of a smart contract and noting that the “digital revolution” will enable 
the creation of a new contract law for digital agreements). 
3 See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1418-
19 (2009) (comparing inconsistent common-law rules governing damages for breaches involving harm 
to real property and concluding that “there is no good reason” for their inconsistency). Stewart 
Macaulay, Klein and the Contradictions of Corporations Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 119, 125 (2005) (“[L]aw 
professors tend to rationalize the common law [of contracts] as consisting of hard core rules surrounded 
by a soft periphery of exceptions . . . . Usually, there is no rule telling us when the core and when the 
periphery applies.”); Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 370 (2004) 
(“The peril that public contract law faces is that many contracting parties have chosen to exit the public 
system of legal enforcement in favour of less costly alternatives over which they have more control. The 
result is that the law of contract is suffering from stagnation and . . . irrelevance.”) 
4 See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A 
Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 555 (1989) (“What do lawyers contribute to technological change 
and economic development? . . . [V]ast amounts of legal time billed to corporate enterprise . . . are 
the pathological symptoms of an over-regulated, excessively litigious culture . . . .”). 
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rare commodities, compared to more mature industries that have perhaps 
accepted the inevitability of complex contractual arrangements.5 
With criticism concentrated in technology-forward industries, it’s no 
surprise that technology is proposed as an answer. Indeed, the desire to 
redesign human affairs according to digital rules—motivated by a desire for 
transparency and efficiency, and an ideological distrust for human 
institutions—accompanies each era’s major technological developments.6 The 
creation of elementary mainframe computers in the early Seventies inspired 
visions of governments and societies structured entirely around data flows and 
statistical modeling.7 It also hinted at revolutions in the internal organization 
of the firm, and in the ways that firms could interact externally. Developments 
in processing power and speed allowed firms to distribute computers 
throughout the business, creating information systems that were granular, 
accurate, and fast, driving new kinds of management decisionmaking.8 The 
maturation of the Internet transformed both the nature of commerce and the 
nature of society. But at each stage, the ultimate effect of disruptive technology 
is both more limited, and more unpredictable, than evangelists initially 
declare.9 The Internet has allowed for unprecedented access to knowledge and 
information, but also has enabled corporate concentration, government 
surveillance, and new types of control over consumers.10 
This Comment analyzes smart contracts, a recent development in the 
quest to replace traditional contract law.11 Smart contracts enable firms to 
 
5 See Scott Edward Walker, Top 10 Reasons Why Entrepreneurs Hate Lawyers, VENTURE HACKS 
(Jan. 14, 2010), http://venturehacks.com/articles/hate-lawyers [https://perma.cc/5AFV-PV4A] 
(noting technology entrepreneurs’ criticisms of lawyers for being poor listeners, too expensive, 
“deal-killers,” and for “over-lawyering”). 
6 See generally 2 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY: THE INFORMATION AGE 
(2d ed. 2009) (analyzing the sociopolitical landscape of contemporary technology). 
7 See generally EDEN MEDINA, CYBERNETIC REVOLUTIONARIES (2011) (describing the 
creation of cybernetics, a field of social science dedicated to understanding how information systems 
affect society). 
8 See E. Burton Swanson, Information Systems Innovation Among Organizations, 40 MGMT. SCI. 
1069, 1069 (1994) (noting that the “widespread impacts of [information systems] on the businesses 
it serves are increasingly acknowledged to be fundamentally strategic”). 
9 See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION (2011) (noting that despite its 
utopian aims, the Internet has provided powerful tools to authoritarian regimes). 
10 See DAVID GOLUMBIA, THE POLITICS OF BITCOIN: SOFTWARE AS RIGHT-WING 
EXTREMISM 6 (2016) (“[I]n the name of vague slogans like ‘internet freedom’, wealth and power 
have concentrated enormously as digital technology has spread all around the globe.”). 
11 Because smart contracts are a relatively new phenomenon and continue to evolve rapidly, 
there is little existing literature applying traditional contracts concepts to blockchain technology. 
Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell provide a useful overview of contract law relevant to smart 
contracts and touch briefly on the concept of flexibility expanded upon here. See Contracts Ex 
Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 44-46), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2936294 [https://perma.cc/7ZYJ-GXAX] (noting that smart contracts make 
it difficult to respond to a change in circumstances that occurs between the “ex ante specification of 
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transact without the need for law or courts. They can autonomously negotiate 
with other parties (or other parties’ smart contracts), and then attach directly 
to the parties’ information systems so that goods or payment promised by the 
contract are automatically delivered. According to the technology’s more 
extreme advocates, smart contracts will revolutionize the way firms transact 
and may fundamentally transform our social and legal institutions. However, 
even if the technology is robust enough to enable such a change, its tangible 
effects on firms’ interactions will be more nuanced than evangelists claim. In 
some instances, it will make transactions more expensive and inefficient than 
the traditional legal contracts it aims to replace. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the technology 
underlying smart contracts, trace its evolution from Bitcoin, and describe a 
sample smart contract in use today. In Part II, I analyze the importance of 
flexibility in the contracting process as a way to manage transaction costs. I 
focus on standards—roughly-defined contract terms that guide parties’ 
behavior without precision—and on informal contract governance, which 
helps mitigate incentives for bad-faith litigation or other abusive behavior. In 
Part III, I compare smart contracts to electronic data interchange (EDI), an 
older contracting technology whose proponents also imagined would 
transform the fundamental nature of contracting. I argue that EDI’s features 
actually enabled—and encouraged—parties to rely on flexibility and informal 
dispute resolution in their contracting process, whereas smart contracts make 
such flexibility impossible. Finally, in Part IV, I identify what exactly makes 
smart contracts so inflexible, and then anticipate some possible responses. 
I. LEX CRYPTOGRAPHIA? 
Today, a new technology dominates conversations about the future of social 
and commercial organization. Broadly labeled “decentralized ledger 
technology” (DLT), the term spans a group of cryptographic tools and 
protocols to exchange, verify, and secure data without the need for centralized 
intermediaries.12 So-called “trustless exchange” is motivated by the same goals 
 
contracts and the ex post adjudication of legal effects”). Levy observes that contracts do more than 
simply create enforceable agreements—there are important social aims accomplished by writing 
“unenforceable,” or “purposefully vague” terms, or by refusing to enforce enforceable terms—and 
that smart contract proponents ignore these dimensions. Karen E. C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-
Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & 
SOC’Y 1, 6-7 (2017). As far as I know, this Comment is the first to compare flexibility in semantic 
contracts and smart contracts, identify the incentives and effects of smart contracts’ inflexibility on 
trading partners, and to compare smart contracts to EDI. 
12 See Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The Invisible Technology That’s Changing the World, PC MAG (Feb. 6, 
2017), https://www.pcmag.com/article/351486/blockchain-the-invisible-technology-thats-changing-
the-wor [https://perma.cc/BUC2-JLVL] (explaining that decentralized ledger technology applies a 
268 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 263 
as technologies that came before—autonomy from inefficient and corruptible 
institutions, an insistence on the primacy and desirability of private social 
ordering, and frustration with the law and lawyers.13 And as with those earlier 
technologies, DLT has attracted a curious mix of sophisticated global 
corporations and shadowy activists, placing IBM, Maersk, and JP Morgan 
alongside cryptoanarchists, cypherpunks, and black market drug kingpins.14 
A. The Rise of Bitcoin 
What unites these seemingly disparate groups is more than an interest in 
using DLT for information storage and exchange. DLT’s earliest but most 
successful application to date is Bitcoin—a “cryptocurrency” built using DLT 
protocols to enable participants to create, store, and exchange money itself.15 
Bitcoin’s market capitalization has soared in the past year, reaching about 
$20B in late 2016, and was the world’s best performing currency during 2015.16 
Bitcoin can be used as payment for hundreds of thousands of firms and 
 
“decentralized network of ‘nodes’ that verify . . . every transaction” and “distributed ‘trustless’ 
consensus” to prevent fraudulent activity). “Nodes” are computers in a decentralized ledger system 
which participate in recording and verifying transactions.  
13 See GOLUMBIA, supra note 10, at 22 (observing that Bitcoin’s popularity is driven by an 
ideological belief that “computer-based expertise” is superior to all other forms of expertise, 
including economics and finance); see also Gabrielle Orum Hernández, With Contract 
Automation, Ambition Doesn’t Always Align with Reality, LEGALTECH NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), 
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202782521057 [https://perma.cc/JAC4-QLGX] (“The idea that 
smart contract technology based on a publicly available distributed ledger could take the place of 
powerful legal and financial industries has an incredible allure . . . .”). 
14 Typically, blockchain gains prominent media coverage when used in either groundbreaking 
corporate initiatives or in cutting-edge criminal enterprises. Compare Nathaniel Popper & Steve Lohr, 
Blockchain: A Better Way to Track Pork Chops, Bonds, Bad Peanut Butter?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/dealbook/blockchain-ibm-bitcoin.html?mcubz=0 
[perma.cc/V54C-5yu7] (noting that global corporations like IBM and Maersk are using blockchain to 
improve information collection and accessibility), with Nathaniel Popper, The Tax Sleuth Who Took 
Down a Drug Lord, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/business/
dealbook/the-unsung-tax-agent-who-put-a-face-on-the-silk-road.html?mcubz=0 [perma.cc/5XNX-
MXA6] (describing law enforcement efforts to identify and convict the operator of an international 
marketplace for illegal drugs which used Bitcoin to facilitate payments). “Cypherpunk” is a social 
movement which believes that privacy in the digital age must be created organically, rather than 
supplied by “governments or corporations.” Nicolas Wenker, Online Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The 
Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 145, 148 (2014). Cypherpunks celebrate 
“cryptographic tools and protocols . . . that might lead to a loosening of government control,” such 
as Bitcoin, blockchain, and other ways to “shield[] digital messages and information.” Id. 
15 The term cryptocurrency reflects the fact that transactions are accomplished and verified 
using cryptographic principles. For a high-level overview, see A Gentle Introduction to Bitcoin, 
BITSONBLOCKS.NET (Sept. 1, 2015), https://bitsonblocks.net/2015/09/01/a-gentle-introduction-to-
bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/UD3X-B6QN] [hereinafter Gentle Introduction]. For a description of 
Bitcoin’s mechanics relevant to smart contracts, see infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
16 Garrick Hileman, State of Bitcoin and Blockchain 2016: Blockchain Hits Critical Mass, COINDESK (Jan. 
28, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-blockchain-2016/ [https://perma.cc/6X4H-TSR5]. 
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service providers, including Microsoft, Dell, Overstock.com, and even the 
Chicago Sun-Times.17 Bitcoin startups have attracted almost a billion dollars 
in venture capital funding.18 
Bitcoin combined two key DLT features, popularizing the technology and 
forming a template for more advanced applications that followed. First, 
Bitcoin harnessed a decentralized tracking system—commonly referred to as 
a ledger—that makes it cheap to record transactions, but very costly to 
commit fraud. Bitcoin’s protocols reward participants who cooperate and 
punish opportunistic behavior,19 with the result that transactions in the 
system can be tracked and recorded with confidence. Technologically, this is 
accomplished using a “blockchain”—a way of recording and reconciling every 
transaction that has ever occurred, between every single participant, going 
back to the beginning of Bitcoin.20 The responsibility of maintaining this 
giant global ledger lies with Bitcoin users themselves, who receive transaction 
fees or newly created Bitcoins for their efforts. This ensures that every 
Bitcoin user is working to update the ledger truthfully, creating a natural 
technological check against fraud.21 While the responsibility for updating the 
 
17 What Can You Buy with Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/
information/what-can-you-buy-with-bitcoins/ [https://perma.cc/324W-YLEC]. 
18 See Hileman, supra note 16. 
19 A foundational definition of opportunism is “self-interest seeking with guile.” OLIVER. E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 255 (1975). A more recent definition is that 
opportunism is “aggressive selfishness [that] disregards the impact of [an actor’s] actions on others,” 
variously including “stealing, cheating, breach of contract, dishonesty [and] distorting data . . . .” 
Timothy G. Hawkins et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relations: 
Research Synthesis and New Frontiers, 37 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 895, 895 (2008). For a review 
of contract scholarship on opportunism, see Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of 
Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 91, 107-08 (2015). Importantly, smart contracts attempt 
to make such behaviors prohibitively costly, and perhaps this is one of technology’s key motivations. 
However, this Comment argues that smart contracts police opportunism in an expensive, inefficient 
way, eliminating alternative approaches that preserve flexibility. 
20 See HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM 94 (2016) (“It’s not a blockchain if its copies are not 
stored, identically, across massively many computers . . . . Fundamentally, the data a blockchain holds 
is a sequence of transactions. And as of today it is essential that no transaction is ever forgotten.”); id. at 
33 (“Blockchains do symmetric computation. Every node in a blockchain stores and computes the same 
data. The nodes even execute the exact same calculations at roughly the exact same moment in time.”). 
21 A major opportunity for fraud in any digital-only currency is “double-spending.” With 
traditional physical currency, once Alice gives her dollar to Bob, she physically cannot spend that 
dollar again. With digital currency, Alice might be tempted to claim that her previously-spent 
Bitcoin still belongs to her. Bitcoin solves this problem by making it computationally inefficient to 
retroactively change a completed transaction. Alice would need to amass 51% of all the computing 
power in the Bitcoin network to successfully double-spend, which is both prohibitively expensive 
and would cause the price of Bitcoin to plummet when others discover the attempt. See Michael 
Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 379-80 (2016) (describing how an 
actor could successfully manipulate the blockchain, though at great cost, using a “51% attack”). Users 
who repeatedly attempt to defraud the Bitcoin blockchain are subject to an automatic ban. See 
Ghassan O. Karame et al., Misbehavior in Bitcoin: A Study of Double-Spending and Accountability, 18 
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blockchain is shared by every user, no single participant can control or modify 
Bitcoin transactions. Once a Bitcoin is spent (or lost) it is gone forever.22 
Second, Bitcoin enabled the instantaneous and direct transfer of value, 
obviating the need for banks or other institutions. A Bitcoin has no physical token 
counterpart23—it is simply an arbitrary unit of information, a solution to a math 
problem that becomes more difficult over time at a pace coded into the protocol.24 
This information can be sent directly to other participants on the Bitcoin network 
without interference from either within or outside the network.25 Bitcoin 
“wallets” are computer programs that keep track of a participant’s Bitcoins in a 
 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. & SYS. SECURITY 2:1, 2:21 (2015) (“Bitcoin nodes locally ban . . . 
the misbehaving user for 24 hours.”). However, such punishment may not be a sufficient 
countermeasure, since users can “modify/spoof their [IP addresses] or . . . connect to and attack 
other peers, who still haven’t blacklisted [the misbehaving user].” Id. 
22 See Matthew Sparkes, The £625m Lost Forever—the Phenomenon of Disappearing Bitcoins, 
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11362827/The-625m-lost-
forever-the-phenomenon-of-disappearing-Bitcoins.html [https://perma.cc/3VXk-5V6K] (“Welsh IT 
worker James Howells famously lost 7,500 Bitcoins in 2013 when he accidentally threw out an old hard disk 
containing his private key. It is reportedly under thousands of tonnes of landfill at a waste recycling centre 
in Pillgwenlly, Newport.”). As of the time of writing, 7500 Bitcoins would be worth almost $45 million. 
23 Though Bitcoin is not a physical currency, it still requires an immense technological 
infrastructure. See Mark Gimein, Virtual Bitcoin Mining Is a Real-World Environmental Disaster, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-12/virtual-bitcoin-
mining-is-a-real-world-environmental-disaster [https://perma.cc/8U62-U6FJ] (noting that Bitcoin 
miners use enough power every day to power half of the Large Hadron Collider). 
24 At a general level, a Bitcoin is generated using hashing algorithms, which enable the one-way 
transformation of data. How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINBASE (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/
information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/ [https://perma.cc/8EGL-HLLB]. Every transaction in the 
Bitcoin system is efficiently combined using a hash, capturing that data in a perfectly accurate way. Id. 
The resulting hash is unique to that set of transactions; if only a single previous transaction is slightly 
altered, the resulting hash of these transactions would be completely different. Id. Computers can easily 
verify that a given hash results from a given set of transactions. Id. To create a new Bitcoin, a Bitcoin 
“miner” discovers an alphanumeric string that, when combined with the already-existing hash of all 
transactions, generates a new string with a very specific property—it starts with a certain number of 
zeroes. Andreas M. Antonopoulos, Mining and Consensus, in BITCOIN & THE BLOCKCHAIN (2014), 
http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/ch08.html [https://perma.cc/BEQ7-CT37]. The 
required number of zeroes increases over time, so that generating these solutions becomes increasingly 
difficult. Id. A full explanation of Bitcoin’s mechanics is beyond the scope of this Comment, but the 
important point is that a Bitcoin is just a piece of information, rather than a physically-existing object, 
and requires no offline support or verification. 
25 For example, if Alice wants to “send” Bob a Bitcoin that she owns, she’ll need three pieces 
of information: her Bitcoin’s address, roughly analogous to her bank account number; her private 
key, an alphanumeric string that verifies her ownership of the Bitcoin at that address, roughly 
analogous to a PIN; and a private key that creates a unique mathematical link. See Gentle Introduction, 
supra note 15. All three pieces of information are cryptographically locked into place once Alice 
completes the send request and inputs her private key. Id. 
If Alice’s private key is lost, there’s no way for her to ever verify her ownership of that Bitcoin. 
If the private key is stolen by Charlie, now Charlie has access to the Bitcoin as well as Alice 
(presumably Charlie will immediately transfer it to a new address controlled by only him). Hence 
maintaining the security of the private key is extremely important. 
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graphically accessible way, but because a Bitcoin is simply a series of 
alphanumeric strings, it can also be “stored” using a piece of paper and a pencil.26 
Eventually, the number of new Bitcoins that can be created will drop to 
zero.27 Hence Bitcoins are a currency only to the extent that the rest of the 
world finds them valuable and scarce. Judging by Bitcoin’s meteoric rise in 
price28—and the growing number of firms dedicated to generating, storing, 
selling, and transacting in Bitcoin—the world finds them to be both. 
B. How to Lease a Car from an Anarchist 
By combining decentralization with instantaneous exchange, Bitcoin 
offered a rudimentary but compelling use of DLT. Today, however, 
blockchain protocols can do more than simply transmit and store Bitcoins. 
“Virtual machine” protocols now enable computer code to be embedded and 
executed in a blockchain itself, allowing for an incredibly complex range of 
operations to take place via the same underlying technology that 
accomplishes a Bitcoin transfer.29 These operations can monitor the 
satisfaction of specified conditions, such as blockchain events (e.g., the 
completion of a Bitcoin transaction) or those that occur off-chain (e.g., data 
 
26 Bitcoin wallets can take a variety of forms, including software wallets, hardware wallets made from 
USB drives, and fully offline wallets. Bitcoin experts suggest avoiding software-only wallets since they are 
vulnerable to hackers or technical problems with the computer storing the Bitcoin addresses. See, e.g., Cold 
Storage, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage [https://perma.cc/9Y-69-DWR6] 
(suggesting that users who own a significant amount of Bitcoins should “keep[] the majority of the 
reserve in cold storage, or in other words, not present on the web server or any other computer”). 
27 According to rules programmed into the Bitcoin protocol, no more than twenty-one million 
Bitcoins will ever be created. What is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/
information/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/6BF9-E954] (“The bitcoin protocol—the rules that make 
bitcoin work—say that only 21 million bitcoins can ever be created by miners.”). 
28 Though most of this rise might be due to speculation. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin 
Price Soars, Fueled by Speculation and Global Currency Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/business/dealbook/bitcoin-price-soars-fueled-by-speculation-
and-global-currency-turmoil.html?mcubz=0 [htpps://perma.cc/2DRE-4KXP] (“[H]eavy trading on 
Chinese Bitcoin exchanges, much of it by automated software, suggests that most of the price 
movement is a result of bets by speculators.”). 
29 To be precise, this new generation of blockchain technology relies on a different protocol 
than Bitcoin. One major Bitcoin alternative is Ethereum, which provides a richer set of development 
options compared to Bitcoin’s relatively limited features. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, A Next-Generation 
Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, GITHUB, https://github.com/ethereum/
wiki/wiki/White-Paper [https://perma.cc/F8NP-8EZ6] (“Ethereum is . . . an alternative protocol 
for building decentralized applications . . . with a particular emphasis on . . . the ability of different 
applications to . . . interact . . . . Ethereum does this by building . . . a blockchain with a built-in 
Turing-complete programming language, allowing anyone to write smart contracts and 
decentralized applications [with their] own arbitrary rules.”). Further, both Bitcoin and Ethereum 
have virtual machines, since both can process scripts. Diedrich, supra note 20, at 199. However, 
Ethereum’s virtual machine is far more robust and is therefore seen as the single, definitive virtual 
machine for building smart contracts. Id. at 202-03. 
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from an Internet-of-Things enabled device), interact with other functions, 
and generate more outputs than payment and non-payment. 
To offer an analogy that might be helpful, consider the difference between 
text messaging and full-fledged websites. In the former case, text messages 
are either sent or not sent, based on a two-way line of communication 
between phones. In the latter, a variety of complex functions—responsible 
for rendering the visual layout of the website, verifying and communicating 
your identity with the site, pointing to other functions that exist elsewhere 
on the web, and so on—reside on your computer, on the site’s server, or 
anywhere else. Not only can the website send and receive messages, but it can 
display media, alter and rearrange information, and communicate with other 
sites and devices.30 
Most blockchain applications to date have focused on modernizing the 
internal information apparatus of firms. An array of blockchain companies 
are offering products that make recordkeeping cheaper and more accurate, 
such as in healthcare data tracking, property registration, freight registration 
and tracking, supply chain management, and protecting intellectual property, 
among others.31 However, blockchain’s more extreme evangelists imagine that 
 
30 Though this analogy gives a sense of the increase in sophistication accomplished by blockchain 
virtual machines, it is misleading in an important respect. SMS messages are routed through cellular 
service providers which are at the behest of human executives, who themselves are susceptible to outside 
influence. See Jeremy Scahill & Margot Williams, A Secret Catalogue of Government Gear for Spying on 
Your Cellphone, INTERCEPT (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:23 PM) (“Most [of the devices] can be used to geolocate 
people, but the documents indicate that some have more advanced capabilities, like eavesdropping on 
calls and spying on SMS messages.”). Websites exist on servers that are in the jurisdiction of one locale 
or another, and thus subject to both legal and illegal surveillance. See Aiden Warren & Alexander 
Dirksen, Augmenting State Secrets: Obama’s Information War, 9 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 68, 74 (2014) 
(describing the NSA’s PRISM program, which allowed intelligence agencies and law enforcement to 
view “email, video and voice chat, videos, [and] photos” as well as activity on platforms like “Microsoft, 
Yahoo, Google, [and] Facebook”). Blockchain networks exist outside the control of any individuals—
much less CEOs—and at least theoretically beyond the state’s legal reach. 
31 See, e.g., Jamie Condliffe, DeepMind’s New Blockchain-Style System Will Track Health-Care Records, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603828/deepminds-new-blockchain-style-
system-will-track-health-care-records/ [https://perma.cc/9WD9-GBWC] (describing “a blockchain-style 
system that will carefully track how every shred of patient data is used”); Michael J. Casey & Pindar Wong, 
Global Supply Chains are About to Get Better, Thanks to Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://
hbr.org/2017/03/global-supply-chains-are-about-to-get-better-thanks-to-blockchain [https://perma.cc/P92X-
U3R7] (“[A] slew of startups and corporations are exploring a radical solution to this problem: using a 
blockchain to transfer title and record permissions and activity logs so as to track the flow of goods and 
services between businesses and across borders.”); Ben Dickson, Blockchain Could Completely Transform 
the Music Industry, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 7, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/01/07/blockchain-could-
completely-transform-the-music-industry/ [https://perma.cc/BD4L-FQNX] (“Digital rights expression 
is one of the biggest problems the music industry is tackling presently . . . . This is the first place we can 
expect blockchain to bring change.”); David Z. Morris, Maersk Tests Blockchain-Based Freight Tracking, 
FORTUNE (March 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/05/272weden-tests-blockchain-based-
freight-tracking/ [https://perma.cc/6TYP-B6QT] (“Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company, 
has completed the first test of a system that would manage the company’s cargos using blockchain, the 
2017] Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility 273 
the technology will transform not only how firms organize internally, but also 
how they interact externally.32 If blockchain code can instantaneously effect an 
exchange of goods based on the satisfaction of specified conditions, why would 
firms rely on expensive, unpredictable agreements written in human language? 
The appeal of “smart contracts,” agreements built in computer code and stored 
on a blockchain, is in many ways similar to that of Bitcoin and other early 
blockchain applications, harnessing the same critical features like decentralized 
consensus, instantaneous exchange, and complex computational states. A smart 
contract is immutable and unmodifiable once created, since its logic is seeded into 
a blockchain spread across multiple points.33 This prevents powerful parties from 
opportunistically breaching the contract or extracting a beneficial modification 
that disadvantages weaker counterparties.34 It is written and executed without the 
need for expensive intermediating institutions; by interacting with devices that 
monitor states of the world and with firms’ internal information systems, it can 
check whether conditions are satisfied and then instantaneously provide the 
bargained-for goods or money.35 And it can exist either in isolation or be nested 
within multiple sets of other smart contracts, so that its complexity can scale up to 
meet whatever transaction logic the parties desire. 
A seminal smart contract example is an automated car lease.36 Suppose 
that Bob has a fleet of cars, one of which he wants to lease to Alice. Further 
suppose that in this world, cars can be operated by a digitally-enabled “key” 
such as a smartphone app, QR code, or fingerprint, which can be activated 
and terminated remotely. According to the smart contract, Alice provides 
down payment to Bob in exchange for use of his car for a set amount of time. 
Both Alice and Bob have pre-specified a bargaining logic based on their 
desired terms, such as lease length, interest rate, size of down payment, and 
 
distributed ledger technology behind Bitcoin.”); Pete Rizzo, Sweden Tests Blockchain Smart Contracts for 
Land Registry, COINDESK (June 16, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/272weden-blockchain-smart-
contracts-land-registry/ [https://perma.cc/W3B6-ZCR5] (“The government of Sweden is testing a system 
for registering and recording land titles that utilizes blockchain in a bid to digitize real estate processes.”). 
32 DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION 95-117 (2016). 
33 See DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 7 (“[Smart contracts] cannot be stopped . . . . Blockchains are 
like a force of nature.”).  
34 Michael del Castillo, Relax Lawyers, Nick Szabo Says Smart Contracts Won’t Kill Jobs, 
COINDESK (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/nick-szabo-lawyers-jobs-safe-in-smart-
contract-era/ [https://perma.cc/6RX3-U2JE] (“The result is that while traditional law is relatively 
flexible, involving interpretation and judgment (and can therefore be corrupted), a software version 
is ‘rigid and predictable.’”). Literature about traditional contracts reflects similar concerns. See 
Cimino, supra note 19, at 124 (2015) (discussing common law and UCC rules on agreement 
modification and their effects on opportunistic behavior). 
35 Hernández, supra note 13 (arguing that “the hallmark” of a smart contract is for it to “operate 
without the need for human legal interpretation”). 
36 See Szabo, supra note 2 (“As another example, consider a hypothetical digital security system 
for automobiles. The smart contract design strategy suggests that we successively refine security 
protocols to more fully embed in a property the contractual terms which deal with it.”) 
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car specification. Bob runs a blockchain program that monitors his accounts 
and inventory, analyzes Alice’s proposed terms, and then autonomously 
negotiates terms acceptable to both. Alice runs a similar blockchain program 
that monitors her personal accounts to ensure sufficient funds to pay for the 
lease. Both applications are authorized to bargain and enter into a smart 
contract for their respective owners.37 Once the agreement is formed, Bob’s 
smart contract discovers Alice’s payment, chooses a car that matches her 
desired specifications, and instructs that car to accept her digital key. 
Now, imagine that Alice fails to make an interest payment and falls into 
default. Not only could the smart contract respond by terminating her digital key, 
but it could activate a variety of other complex actions. It could terminate the key 
only until Alice cures her default. It could activate a bank’s key so that the car can 
be repossessed. And it could monitor the car’s activity once the breach is 
discovered, such that the car is not disabled while driving down the highway.38 
Even this relatively simple smart contract demonstrates the technology’s 
disruptive potential. When parties can attach smart contracts directly to their 
property and money, and when autonomous negotiation agents are capable of 
manifesting the parties’ intent to be bound, there is no need for courts to 
interpret or enforce agreements. Hence commenters have gone as far as 
predicting (and sometimes rejoicing at) the imminent death of contract law. 
Smart contracts “eliminate the need for legal enforcement;”39 they represent 
“a technological alternative” to the legal system itself.40 Smart contracts 
threaten “thousands of [legal] jobs”41 in the short term and “cast a stark light 
 
37 Id. (noting that “search and negotiation” constitute part of the smart contract); see also 
Florian Glatz, How We Use Smart Contracts at SatoshiPay to Change the Internet’s Economy Forever. 
Today!, MEDIUM (Feb. 1, 2016), https://medium.com/@heckerhut/how-we-use-smart-contracts-at-
satoshipay-to-change-the-internet-s-economy-forever-today-777988a868d 
[https://perma.cc/D6NG-CS4K] (describing blockchain technology that enables “[web] browsers to 
become autonomous agents that negotiate and perform on contracts for their users”). 
38 A version of this contract already exists, though in a pre-blockchain form. See Michael 
Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Federal Agency Begins Inquiry Into Auto Lenders’ Use of GPS 
Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/dealbook/gps-
devices-car-loans.html [https://perma.cc/FE6J-RX52] (“[T]he head of collections at a Louisiana 
credit union said he could monitor a vehicle’s whereabouts on his smartphone and once disabled a 
borrower’s ignition while shopping at a Walmart.”). 
39 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 11, at 20. 
40 Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic 
Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMMS. TECH. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 21), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885241 [https://perma.cc/6NMT-B38M]. 
41 Rebecca Campbell, New York City Law Firm Experiments with Blockchain Smart Contracts, 
CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/new-york-city-law-firm-
experiments-blockchain-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/3SF7-BRCZ]; cf. del Castillo, supra note 34 
(noting Nick Szabo’s claim that lawyers will perform functions “complimentary” to smart contract formation). 
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on the future of the legal profession,”42 freeing contracts from intermediation 
by courts.43 “Contracts written as immutable code on private blockchains” 
will ensure that transactions between firms “hum[] along harmoniously . . . 
self-executing and self-regulating.”44 
There are many other real benefits of smart contracting, covered at length 
by commentators who take a more reasoned approach.45 Though a full 
discussion of those benefits is beyond the scope of this paper, some are worth 
mentioning. Agreements written in code and linked directly to firms’ 
information systems will reduce drafting and accounting costs for at least 
some agreements.46 The cryptographic technology underlying blockchains 
provides a cheap and effective way to ensure the integrity of data. Payment 
via digital Bitcoin wallets reduces costs to both parties by minimizing reliance 
on intermediaries, spreading those costs across the entire decentralized 
network of blockchain participants. And by ensuring agreements are 
immediately and irrevocably performed, smart contracts lower the cost of 
monitoring performance and may sidestep the need for litigation in some 
situations.  
But there is more to a contract than recordkeeping and rote performance. A 
written contract memorializes an understanding between parties such that it 
becomes a legible agreement enforceable by a court.47 While such contracts are 
not the only type of enforceable agreement, they are the most efficient way to 
ensure that the court correctly understands what parties were willing to 
exchange under their deal.48 That understanding can be essential when the court 
needs to supplement or correct the agreement. And, as we will see, these 
documents provide parties with important tools to manage uncertainties 
inherent in the agreement process and responses if the agreement goes wrong. 
 
42 James Eyers & Misa Han, Lawyers Prepare for ‘Driverless M&A’ as Smart Contract Era Dawns, 
FIN. REV. (June 19, 2016), http://www.afr.com/technology/lawyers-prepare-for-driverless-ma-as-
smart-contract-era-dawns-20160616-gpknyz [https://perma.cc/K3SM-TPJV]. 
43 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 39 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol71/iss2/3/ 
[https://perma.cc/H5RH-83SG] (“If financial transactions can be freed of banks as intermediaries, 
then contracts can be freed of courts as intermediaries.”). 
44 Matt Byrne, Do Lawyers Have a Future?, LAWYER (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.thelawyer.com/
issues/online-september-2016/do-lawyers-have-a-future-2/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
45 See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32. 
46 See, e.g., Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhami, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–
Feb. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/JZV4-UQY4] (“Firms 
are built on contracts, from incorporation to buyer-supplier relationships to employee relations. If contracts 
are automated, then what will happen to traditional firm structures, processes, and intermediaries like 
lawyers and accountants?”). 
47 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.2 (2d ed. 1990). 
48 See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 26 (2014) (noting that parties use written contracts to restrict attempts to add 
or modify obligations). 
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On the other hand, smart contracts are more like apps than contracts, fully 
collapsing the distinction between agreement formation and execution.49 
Whereas legal agreements must be voluntarily performed (or compelled 
through court order), smart contracts are composed of computer code 
permanently lodged in a blockchain. That code executes automatically and 
reliably once the parties’ chosen conditions have been satisfied. And since its 
terms have been decentralized and distributed to every blockchain node,50 
 
49 See DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 3 (“Blockchains collapse agreement and execution. Because a 
smart contract both is the agreement and executes it. In business, governance, and law. They are ‘collapsed’ 
into one thing, not just simplified or packaged together.”). According to some commentators, a smart 
contract isn’t a smart contract at all—it is merely a computer program that performs a pre-existing 
agreement, which itself was made pursuant to traditional contract law. See, e.g., Cheng Lim et al., Smart 
Contracts, Bridging the Gap Between Expectation and Reality, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (July 11, 2016), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2016/07/smart-contracts-bridging-gap-between-
expectation-and-reality [https://perma.cc/6P5K-7L53] (“The term ‘smart contract’ is a misnomer. A 
smart contract shares some theoretical similarities with a legal contract . . . but it is important to note 
where those similarities start and end.”). Regardless of where one draws the line between a “contract” 
and a “performance mechanism,” there are still unique costs of smart contracts that semantic contracts avoid. 
See Anthony Macey, What’s in a Name?—The Disambiguiation of Smart Contracts, MEDIUM (July 8, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@anthonymacey/whats-in-a-name-the-disambiguation-of-smart-contracts-
daca8276db4 [https.perma.cc/6P5K-7L53] (noting that smart contracts and traditional legal contracts 
have different goals and describing possible permutations of the two). 
50 The extent of decentralization in blockchain varies. At one end of the spectrum are permissionless 
blockchains, like Ethereum or Bitcoin. There, anyone can perform or verify transactions once they install 
the correct software. DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 100. On the other end of the spectrum are permissioned 
blockchains, typically intended for enterprise use. For example, Quorum is a blockchain being developed by 
JP Morgan for interbank transactions. It adopts the core Ethereum architecture but makes certain changes 
to enhance privacy of network participants. See JP Morgan Chase, Quorum Whitepaper, GITHUB, 
https://github.com/jpmorganchase/quorum-docs/blob/master/Quorum%20Whitepaper%20v0.1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DAH3-CHBY] (proposing a modification of Ethereum for enterprise use). And, 
importantly, it only admits certain preapproved entities as participants. Id. On permissioned blockchains, 
on-chain activity is durably linked to off-chain identity. DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 194. 
The permissionless/permissioned distinction has important effects on agreement flexibility. 
Transactions on permissionless blockchains systems are expensive, slow, and irreversible, due to the 
enormous number of participants verifying and processing the governing code. High participation 
is what provides the benefit of maximum decentralization—replacing costly or corruptible 
intermediaries with user-driven consensus. Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, 
ETHEREUM BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-
blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/8AQ2-NFDP] [hereinafter Buterin, Private Blockchains] (explaining 
that “if we have a domain name system on a blockchain, and a currency on the same blockchain, then 
we can cut costs to near-zero with a smart contract”). But it is also what ensures that smart contracts 
cannot be undone or flexibly modified. 
On the other hand, transactions on private blockchains are verified quickly and cheaply. Id. In 
these systems, certain participants are designated as more trusted than others, a feature built directly 
into the protocol itself. Whereas in public blockchains, transactions must be confirmed by a majority 
of participants—an enormous number of individual processes in the case of Ethereum—transactions 
in permissioned blockchains can be successfully processed by just a few trusted nodes. Id. Fewer 
required confirmations means lower transaction fees and speedy confirmation. Id. 
However, the advantages of private blockchains exist in tandem with reliance on offline identity. 
A private blockchain maintained by JP Morgan, for example, requires that participants know that 
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there is no room for “second thoughts . . . arm twisting or delayed 
payments.”51 The terms exist independently of the parties, with a blockchain 
guaranteeing and enabling their performance.52 As a result, the transactional 
relationship created by a smart contract between two firms must be 
completely formed and precisely defined, eliminating forms of flexibility that 
are crucial to the contracting process. In this sense, the transaction costs of 
entering into smart contracts may actually be higher than those associated 
with traditional semantic contracts. 
There are two sources of such costs. First, smart contracts create 
negotiation costs by requiring parties to fully and precisely define all future 
states of the contract. Such definition may be impossible,53 such as when 
parties are contracting in volatile or uncertain environments, or redundant, 
such as when parties abide by the same trade customs or commercial practices. 
In traditional contracts, parties can manage these costs by using standards—
loosely-defined contract terms that take on more precise meaning during the 
course of performance.54 Smart contracts foreclose on such tools by requiring 
that every term is explicit and precise before execution takes place.55 
Second, smart contracts raise the costs of responding to breach by 
removing enforcement flexibility. Parties that cannot build bespoke contracts 
prefer to avoid litigation and resolve contract disputes informally. Litigation 
over generic contracts is unpredictable and extremely costly, incentivizing 
parties to bootstrap their relationship—their history of business and the 
 
the bank’s super-nodes are indeed operated by the bank, and that participants consent to be bound 
by the bank’s governance decisions. Whenever the bank wants to change some technical feature of 
the blockchain it can do so unilaterally. Id. And, more to the point, the bank can undo or modify 
transactions on the blockchain at will. Id. As a result, participants on permissioned blockchains are 
typically bound by “off-chain, real-world agreements.” DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 195. A 
blockchain built using offline identity, and buttressed by the power of traditional semantic contracts, 
is thus able to better withstand the transaction costs discussed throughout this Comment. 
Offline institutions—in this case, market reputation as a source of trust, and semantic contract 
construction as a source of dispute resolution—do some of the work accomplished by system-wide 
consensus in permissionless chains. This makes smart contract purists uncomfortable, driving passionate 
debate about whether permissioned chains are a good development. Buterin has observed a “backlash 
from those who see [permissioned chains] as either compromising the whole point of decentralization or 
being a desperate act of dinosaurish middlemen trying to stay relevant.” Buterin, Private Blockchains, 
supra. 
In general, this Comment analyzes smart contracts in permissionless systems. These provide the most 
striking contrast to traditional agreement formation. For readers interested in transaction dynamics in 
permissioned blockchains, some of this Comment’s observations about EDI would apply—both systems 
are forms of transaction automation that use offline activity to solve the costs of inflexibility. 
51 DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 168. 
52 Id. 
53 See Szabo, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the effect of “mental transaction costs” on defining 
and drafting a contract); see also infra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
54 See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
55 See infra notes 138–145 and accompanying text. 
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promise of more business in the future—as a cheap way to constrain 
opportunistic behavior.56 Smart contracts remove these informal strategies 
from parties’ range of responses to breach. Once initialized, a smart contract 
creates a permanent and unalterable link between the terms of the contract 
and the information systems it manipulates, lasting until the transaction is 
complete. Without the ability to flexibly enforce their agreement, parties who 
determined that custom legal agreements were too expensive will instead be 
forced to rely on customized and equally-expensive blocks of code.57 
Though the rise of smart contracts is surely part of a broader “Lex 
Cryptographia”—an awakening to the power of decentralization and digital 
exchange58—it is also part of a much longer project to replace contracts and 
contract law with a tool that is supposedly more efficient. One specific 
technology—electronic data interchange (EDI)—promised in the 1970s some 
of the very same things that smart contracts do today. Its proponents imagined 
EDI would go beyond a recordkeeping and data storage tool. They too thought 
that it could be used to enable firms to autonomously and instantaneously form 
contracts with each other, based on electronically-generated terms that 
dynamically reflected inventories and funds. In other words, EDI’s evangelists 
imagined that it was a killer app for contract formation and execution.59 
With the benefit of hindsight, we know this project was ultimately 
unsuccessful. Firms did not replace traditional contracts with EDI networks then, 
and they will not replace contracts with smart contracts today. But EDI is different 
from smart contracts in fundamental ways. As we will see, certain features60 of 
EDI actually enhanced flexibility and therefore improved contracting efficiency 
in ways that smart contracts cannot. Hence EDI did enjoy limited success by 
helping parties resolve conflicts cheaply and without litigation. 
 
56 See infra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
57 See infra note 142–58 and accompanying text. One counterargument is that code can be open-
sourced and therefore cheaper for parties to integrate. For a response to this argument, asserting 
that the open-sourced nature of smart contracts actually results in additional costs, see infra notes 
163–170 and accompanying text. 
58 See Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the 
Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2580664 [https://perma.cc/Z2MU-XG5F] (analyzing the “benefits and drawbacks of this emerging 
decentralized technology”). 
59 See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 11 (1991) (“[T]he day of 
‘interactive’ EDI is coming . . . . Futurists see the day when computers negotiate. One computer 
will offer to buy 500 widgets, and the second counteroffers with 300. The first will accept the 
counteroffer to form a contract.”); see also infra notes 110–137 and accompanying text. 
60 More precisely, EDI’s lofty features were incompletely implemented. Were EDI to be built using 
the same sophistication and technology available to smart contracts today, it would have similar weaknesses. 
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II. FLEXIBILITY AND SEMANTIC CONTRACTS 
Smart contracts are useful because they eliminate the possibility of breach, 
forcing parties to honor their original agreements.61 This quality reduces the 
amount of resources each party needs to monitor the other and avoids the high 
cost of litigation.62 Thus, smart contracts enable “trustless” transactions, 
agreements in which parties are secure without a formal legal contract.63 
But these benefits are costly. Parties to a smart contract must sacrifice 
flexibility, which is an important source of efficiency in their transactional 
relationship. In this Part, I detail how such flexibility operates in traditional 
semantic contracts, both during the negotiation and drafting of contract 
terms, and then at breach. First, I argue that standards—ambiguous terms 
like “commercial reasonableness”—help parties defer the costs of precisely 
defining their desired performance. This kind of semantic flexibility has two 
benefits. It helps parties contract through uncertain or volatile environments, 
creating an agreement that becomes more precisely defined as parties learn 
more about future states of the contract. It also helps parties avoid 
unnecessary negotiation over trade customs, which are difficult to precisely 
define but which nonetheless strongly influence parties’ behavior. 
Then, I argue that semantic contracts also give parties enforcement 
flexibility. The ability to easily change contract terms helps parties avoid high 
drafting and renegotiation costs. I argue that this kind of flexibility enables 
parties to avoid unpredictable outcomes and bad faith litigation, thus 
preserving business relationships. 
A. Contracting Through Uncertainty 
Traditional contract law is premised on the “classical image of the 
bargained-for, state-contingent contract,” in which parties anticipate all 
future states of the contract and agree on terms that appropriately manage 
those risks.64 However, parties can never reduce the universe of their 
 
61 See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 58, at 24-25 (“[A]mbiguity and poor drafting can . . . be 
used by parties to wrestle free from contractual conditions that parties no longer want to honor . . . . 
[Parties] can use a smart contract to ensure that a contractual condition is executed, forcing the 
parties to remain bound to their respective obligations.”). For a discussion of what makes smart 
contracts unmodifiable, see infra notes 138–145 and accompanying text. 
62 See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 58, at 26 (“In a system regulated by self-enforcing smart 
contracts . . . there is less of a need for judicial enforcement, because the way in which the rules have 
been defined—the code—is the same mechanism by which they are enforced.”). 
63 There are also a variety of what might be termed second-order benefits of smart contracts, 
including transforming the nature of the firm, harnessing the efficiencies of open-source software 
development, and enabling new kinds of dispute adjudication. I assess these benefits in Part IV. 
64 Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 33. This is the view of textualism, which supports the formalist 
interpretation of contracts based purely on terms in the agreement as opposed to the parties’ broader 
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agreement to fully-defined terms ex ante. It is impossible to completely 
predict events that may complicate performance, and even when events or 
outcomes can be defined ex ante, the parties’ potential responses are too 
complex to model with static contract language.65 A more realistic model of 
agreement formation is that parties use standards, rather than precisely 
defined terms, to “approximate” a state-contingent contract.66 
Parties in an uncertain environment—for example, one threatened by 
technological disruption or market volatility—face two contradictory costs in the 
contracting process.67 First, there are ex ante costs of drafting and negotiating 
over precise terms. These costs increase with uncertainty as parties must use 
greater resources to learn more about the future state of the world, and because 
greater uncertainty suggests a higher risk that their predictions will be wrong.68 
Second, there are anticipated litigation costs. If the parties’ precise predictions 
are incorrect, they may be driven to claim in bad faith that the contract was 
defective, or to opportunistically breach the contract and force suit.69 
Avoiding these costs places parties in a double bind. If parties deploy 
precise terms in a fully integrated contract, they raise ex ante negotiation and 
research costs but lower ex post incentives to litigate.70 Discrete, integrated 
contracts discourage courts from fully examining the parties’ business 
relationship and often enable resolution on summary judgment.71 Conversely, 
parties can minimize their ex ante costs by drafting terms that will likely be 
 
behavior, with some exceptions. Textualists argue for a “‘hard’ parol evidence rule” and for restrictions 
on when a court can deem contract terms in need of supplemental interpretation. Id. at 55. 
65 See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1089, 1091 (1981) (“[Standards are used where] parties are incapable of reducing important terms of 
the arrangement to well-defined obligations . . . [due to their] inability to identify uncertain future 
conditions or because of inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the 
contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.”). 
66 See Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 58 (discussing how parties can approximate a state-contingent 
contract when, for example, they can “anticipate the context in which performance will occur”). 
67 See id. at 55 (defining uncertainty as the disruption of “commercial practices” by “changes in 
technical possibilities and market conditions”). 
68 See id. at 56 (“[S]pecific rules covering possible outcomes . . . come[] at the cost of an 
increased likelihood that the ex ante-specified state contingencies will turn out to be incomplete or 
simply wrong ex post.”). 
69 See id. (noting that in a fully-defined but ultimately inaccurate contract there is an “incentive for the 
party disfavored by the contract’s outcome” to engage in “opportunistic litigation driven by moral hazard”). 
70 See id. (noting that “a complete . . . contract that specifies ex ante the outcome in each future 
state of the world” narrows a court’s examination of the broader context of the agreement in possible 
future litigation). 
71 See id. at 42 (“If . . . a court decides to consider additional context evidence, it must necessarily 
deny a motion for summary judgment . . . legally sophisticated commercial parties prefer [fully-integrated 
contracts] so that disputes can be resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial.”). 
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inaccurate or by leaving such terms out of the agreement altogether, though 
the latter option does increase their ex post costs of litigation.72 
Alternatively, parties can use performance standards as a middle ground. 
Performance standards, a form of semantic flexibility, allow parties to contract 
without completely defining adequate performance ex ante.73 Rather than 
leave a term undefined or potentially wrongly defined, parties can use 
concepts like commercial reasonableness to approximate their transactional 
goals.74 Standards gain meaning through the “unique, interdependent 
relationships” that form a transactional context.75 Standards are also 
vulnerable to ex post litigation, but parties can manage those costs using 
contractual tools to specify an interpretive scope tuned to the characteristics 
of industry practice and to the transaction itself. 
For example, consider a contract to hire a sales agent. The contract may 
specify minute aspects of the agent’s behavior, but it cannot describe every 
action the agent must take during the life of the contract. Requiring that the 
agent make “commercially reasonable efforts” to sell a product is preferable 
to a term that attempts to be absurdly comprehensive, or one that merely 
requires that the agent “sell the product.”76 The hirer’s ex ante gain in 
certainty about the agent’s actions under the contract outweighs the ex post 
cost of litigation over reasonableness.77 
This balance occurs when performance can be more easily evaluated ex post 
by a court than ex ante by the parties. When parties draft with specificity, they 
are choosing to evaluate performance themselves at the time of drafting. When 
parties use performance standards, they are calling on courts to evaluate 
performance later in time. Empirical evidence indicates that courts are willing 
to assign meaning to vaguely defined terms using the parties’ transactional 
context, and only rarely find a contract unenforceable due to ambiguity.78 
However, judicial enforcement of standards is limited to circumstances where 
 
72 See id. at 57 (“[T]he greater the ex ante uncertainty, the potentially more important the ex 
post resort to standards and therefore to context, but with the increased potential for judicial mistake 
and opportunistic-motivated litigation.”). 
73 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 1127 (noting that standards reflect “uncertainty about 
factual conditions during performance and an extraordinary degree of difficulty in describing 
specifically the desired adaptations to contingencies”). 
74 Other examples of contractual standards include best effort clauses, fiduciary duties of 
agents to principals, and the performance of obligations in good faith. See id. at 1104, 1127, 1139. 
75 Id. at 1092. 
76 See Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 60-65 (noting that a “commercially reasonable efforts” clause 
may be used where a party’s actions are “dependent on the sequential outcome of uncertain events”). 
77 For a discussion of specific transaction costs involved with best efforts clauses, and 
contractual tools to manage them, see Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 1112-26. 
78 Id. at 1120 (citing Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
aff ’d, 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
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their use is the result of ex ante uncertainty, rather than the choice to “discard[] 
verifiable information” that could have been used cheaply.79 
The decision between precision and standards is not binary, but forms a 
spectrum of options that parties can adapt to the risk of judicial 
misinterpretation. If a transaction’s context is clear and occurs within an industry 
with concrete transactional norms, the risk of misinterpretation is low.80 
Participants in a more ambiguous context can increase contract specificity by 
defining the relevant industry, practices, and transactions against which the 
court should interpret the standard.81 Thus, performance standards provide 
parties with the benefit of “hindsight,” enabling transactions that could not occur 
if complete specificity were required.82 They provide semantic flexibility 
tailored to parties’ particular industries and transactional contexts. 
B. Avoiding Redundant Negotiation 
Performance standards can also lower negotiation costs by providing a way 
for parties to loosely reference prevailing trade customs or commercial 
practices. Parties gain the benefit of terms they would have mutually chosen 
anyway, without having to write and bargain for those terms explicitly.83 
Every agreement has a broader commercial context that affects parties’ 
perceptions of their obligations.84 Parties incur negotiation costs to minimize 
the risk of bona fide misinterpretation or bad-faith litigation. But commercial 
context is amorphous. Even parties that ostensibly subscribe to the same 
custom may define it differently.85 The costs of drafting a precise term that 
 
79 Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 
1654-55 (2003) (reviewing cases and finding that courts enforced incomplete agreements where 
parties “were forced to cope with problems of hidden action and hidden information”). 
80 See Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 62-67 (noting that contractual specificity will vary based 
on the clarity of the agreement’s “subject matter, industry, and surrounding circumstances”). 
Importantly, such practices should be both easily identified and easily verified by the court. 
Otherwise there are high incentives for parties to falsely claim the existence of a commercial practice 
if it supports their position in litigation. Id. at 57. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 62. When uncertainty becomes great enough, parties will forego a contract entirely and build 
forms of informal information exchange. Id. at 57-62 (“At some point, uncertainty becomes so pervasive that 
the parties cannot anticipate or specify the relevant context ex ante even through the invocation of broad 
standards . . . [those parties] forgo both text and context . . . by resorting to collaborative contracting.”). 
83 Clayton P. Gillette, Interpretation and Standardization in Electronic Sales Contracts, 53 SMU L. REV. 
1431, 1438 (2000) (“[P]arties to the trade understand and accept the risk allocation made by the custom 
because it generates the same result to which they would have agreed if there had been explicit allocation.”). 
84 See Cimino, supra note 19, at 97 (“[C]ontracting actors [are] aware of each other, aware of 
their community, aware of the self and other’s place in their community, and aware that this moment 
is only one moment in time . . . . Thus, no economic exchange—no transaction, no contract—lacks 
a relevant social background.”). 
85 See Gillette, supra note 83, at 1442 (“[E]ven transacting parties may have different 
interpretations of the custom they both purport to follow.”). 
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completely captures the relevant aspects of customary behavior are 
prohibitively high.86 Instead, parties use implicit, functional versions of 
customs to inform their transactional goals and behavior.87 Despite 
disagreement at the margins, this functional and implicit understanding 
permeates most participants in a given industry.88 
Standards enable parties to reference trade customs without the precision 
required for other contract terms.89 When courts enforce custom-based 
standards, they create a valuable “public good” that defrays negotiation and 
drafting costs incurred by participants in their industry while providing 
parties with the outcome they expect.90 This also creates a “judicial insurance 
policy” that applies to trade practice standards, policing against abusive 
behavior with no need for parties to specifically define breach.91 
Importantly, such standards are not mandatorily or uniformly enforced in 
every agreement. Parties can opt for fully-defined performance terms where 
appropriate, and can use textual tools like integration clauses to control the 
scope and direction of a court’s inquiry when it attempts to interpret a 
standard.92 Merger clauses, for example, restrict a court to a plain meaning 
interpretation of some sections of the contract.93 Parties textually define their 
shared understanding of the relevant context by explaining their business 
goals and situating the transaction in an industry context.94 Agreements that 
 
86 Id. at 1443 (noting that attempting to precisely define a custom “increases exponentially the 
possibility of conflicts . . . or the incorporation into a contract of a trade usage of which one of the 
parties was unaware”). 
87 Id. at 1438 (“[T]rade customs [are] sufficiently regularized among members of the trade so 
that negotiation is no longer necessary to agree on the term that is the subject of the custom.”). 
88 Id. (noting that despite “superficial similarity between the [customary] terms that each party 
uses” there is a residual likelihood of misunderstanding). 
89 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 65, at 1104 n.31 (arguing that standards allow parties to harness 
the courts’ interpretation rules, providing the benefit of “common or typical risk allocations . . . 
[without] the expense of bargaining” to create those risk allocations).   
90 Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 44. 
91 Id. at 36 (noting that a standards-based contract “comes with a judicial insurance policy 
permitting the replacement or enrichment of contract terms that, viewed in what the court believes 
to be the proper context, have ill-served the parties’ intentions”). 
92 Id. at 42 (“[P]arties [can] economize on contracting costs by shifting costs from the back end 
of the contracting process . . . where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front end of 
the contracting process (the negotiating and design function) where the parties specify the extent 
to which context will count.”). 
93 Id. (“Parties can [control future litigation costs], for example, by drafting a merger clause that 
integrates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the written contract and then having 
the court apply a plain meaning interpretation to those contract terms that are facially unambiguous.”). 
94 Id. at 58 (“Discursive exposition of [the parties’] goals, expectations, and business plans, 
whether in the contract’s preamble or in particular sections, can supplement precise specifications of 
outcomes while still constraining a court’s discretion to range more widely than the parties want.”). 
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effectively specify relevant commercial context are also easier to resolve on 
summary judgment, reducing incentives to litigate.95 
These tools can be scaled to be more or less specific and can be crafted to 
govern the entire contract or certain sections. The same term may take on 
different meanings in different contexts, depending on the contracting 
environment and litigation risks. The result is that parties construct an 
“interpretive regime” molded to their transaction’s unique characteristics.96 
This semantic flexibility is absent from the computer code that composes 
smart contracts. 
C. Enforcement Flexibility 
A second form of flexibility occurs when parties enforce semantic 
contracts. Litigation is a risky and expensive outcome for all parties to a 
contract. When faced with dispute over an agreement, courts sift through the 
transaction, the parties’ history, and relevant commercial context to construct 
the contract that both parties intended.97 This process can cause more damage 
than breach itself.98 Commercial customs are notoriously hard to define and 
even the parties involved may not be fully aware of a custom’s popularity or 
precise boundaries.99 Courts themselves are rarely capable of accurately 
determining and applying customs, and there is evidence that they prefer not 
to even try, relying instead on “interested party testimony and unsupported 
assumptions of reasonable commercial behavior.”100 Highly sophisticated 
parties thus prefer fully integrated contracts that permit only minimal judicial 
interpretation, since the costs of such intervention might be especially large. 
But trading parties range in sophistication and so do their ways of 
memorializing agreements. Agreements typically involve both written and 
unwritten terms. The balance of formal and informal governance measures 
depends on the parties’ transactional objectives, their level of familiarity and 
expectations for future transactions, their trust in each other, and the size and 
 
95 Id. at 41-42 (noting that a dispute over a fully integrated agreement can be resolved on 
summary judgment, reducing enforcement costs). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 36 (noting that some “[c]ontextualist jurisdictions . . . reject the notion that words in 
a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—context free—meaning at all” resulting in the admission 
of extrinsic evidence of the transaction’s context). 
98 Id. at 42 (“[P]arties will rationally invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure that a court 
interpreting the written document . . . will be able to arrive at the ‘correct interpretation’ . . . . Here 
the simple comparison is between the costs of drafting and the costs of a trial.”). 
99 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
100 See Gilson et al., supra note 48, at 90. 
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value of the contract.101 Parties to less formal agreements who nonetheless 
find themselves in litigation face both the high costs of legal fees and the high 
risks of judicial misinterpretation. Less integrated contracts require courts to 
examine a much wider range of transactional and commercial context. 
As a result, parties may choose to resolve contract disputes informally. 
This takes the form of dynamic modification of contract terms based on 
verbal understanding rather than written amendments, selective enforcement 
of contract terms, or voluntary adoption of new obligations. Such recourse 
preserves parties’ ongoing business relationship and the promise of future 
transactions, enabling them to proceed according to commercial norms102 
rather than immediately resorting to expensive and unpredictable litigation 
that often destroys their ability to transact.103 
Despite this preference for informal contract governance, the mere 
presence of an enforceable, litigable contract stabilizes the transaction. 
Litigation as a worst-case option ensures that the parties’ obligations under 
an agreement will, if necessary, be provided with an authoritative judicial 
interpretation.104 Evidence suggests parties who rely primarily on 
“gentlemen’s agreements” are more likely to end up in court because they do 
not understand their respective duties.105 Familiarity with how the general 
contours of a written agreement would function in court—even if the 
document itself is unsophisticated—is associated with less litigation.106 
Hence the presence of a litigable document and the option not to enforce it 
are inherently valuable. For highly sophisticated parties to customized contracts, 
the ability to constrict the judicial interpretive process reduces the incentive to 
litigate and enhances predictability. For less sophisticated parties relying on a 
combination of boilerplate and transactional norms, the “background threat of 
 
101 See Catherine Mitchell, Contracts and Contract Law: Challenging the Distinction Between the 
‘Real’ Deal and the ‘Paper’ Deal, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 675, 678 (2009) (reviewing research 
about the relationship between the “legal and non-legal measures . . . governing transactions”). 
102 Id. at 679 (noting the distinction between “relationship preserving norms” like flexible 
agreement modification and the use of courts to enforce legal agreements). 
103 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 55-67 (1963) (noting that some contracting parties view legal agreements with 
skepticism and as detrimental to commercial relationships). 
104 See Alessandro Arrighetti et al., Contract Law, Social Norms, and Inter-Firm Cooperation, 21 
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 171, 186 (1997) (“The vast majority of firms saw both the use of writing and 
the attachment of legal force as important means of clarifying the agreement and providing for 
security in the event of a dispute.”). 
105 See Mitchell, supra note 101, at 688 (reviewing research on firms that prefer to rely on 
informal agreements, which found that “use of looser commitments, particularly based on 
interpersonal relationships, could often be a source of disputes”). 
106 See id. (“[I]t was in fact participants’ knowledge of law and legal processes that made 
recourse to law unnecessary.”). 
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possible legal action” guards against opportunistic behavior, while the option not 
to litigate allows those transactional norms to flourish.107 
Thus, parties can use both formal and informal obligations, as well as 
fully-defined contract terms and generally-defined standards, to create an 
agreement tuned to their transactional history, commercial practice, and 
market risks.108 When smart contract proponents dismiss traditional 
contracting for being too unpredictable, messy, or time-consuming—in other 
words, for being too human—they overlook the reality that every transaction 
and every set of trading partners is unique. Each grapples differently with the 
challenge of fully-specifying performance ex ante and the pressure to 
informally modify agreements. Contractual flexibility, driven by the richness 
of semantic expression and the power of human judgment, provides an 
efficient way to manage those costs. 
III. FLEXIBILITY AND ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE 
Smart contracts and EDI are both part of a larger project to replace the 
complex and ambiguous nature of language contracts with something more 
efficient. However, the two tools accomplish this project to different degrees. 
EDI’s replacement of human contracting was incomplete because it was not 
technically robust enough to support a full range of business logic or deeply 
integrate with participants’ information systems. Hence it enhanced the 
human elements of contracting while making certain activities supporting the 
agreement—such as recordkeeping and report creation—more efficient. 
On the other hand, blockchain not only enables information to be stored, 
accessed, and secured according to infinitely complex business rules. It also 
connects smart contracts to the information systems responsible for executing 
those business rules. A vision of autonomous business entities, operating 
without human oversight, is not far-fetched.109 At the least, the possibility 
requires us to think about what is gained or lost as human businesses rely 
more and more on automated contract creation. 
In this Part, I recount the history of EDI and analyze claims made by its 
proponents. I argue that these commenters were perhaps correct, though for 
 
107 Id. at 689. 
108 For example, parties agreeing to innovation contracts frequently create formal governance 
mechanisms for their relationship but rarely intend for them to be enforced by courts. Such contracts 
are particularly delicate and relationship-intensive, and the possibility of judicial intervention can 
stymy the formation of trust. See Cimino, supra note 19, at 126 (“[R]emoving the threat of enforcement 
in [innovation agreements] at the early stages of the parties’ relationship is critical to create an 
environment likely to take the relationship from the innovation stage to the production stage.”). 
109 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 126-130 (describing a “distributed 
autonomous enterprise . . . powered by blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, where 
autonomous agents can self-aggregate into radically new models of the enterprise”). 
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the wrong reasons: EDI was indeed a powerful new way to transact, but 
primarily as a result of processes it failed to replace. EDI did not transform the 
nature of business by making firms more rational and automated. Instead, it 
preserved flexible decisionmaking and empowered human managers, enabling 
more dynamic business relationships and more efficient transactions. 
A. The Vanguard of Electronic Contracting (in 1969) 
Frustrated with “excess complexity” in contracting, a Boston-area lawyer 
set out to standardize and categorize contract terms.110 His efforts—
accomplished on a bottom-of-the-line personal computer with eight kilobytes 
of RAM111—launched IBM’s law and computers division in 1969.112 He 
created a standardized language to describe and categorize contracts 
electronically, which encapsulated data like who was covered by the contract, 
actions accomplished by the contract, and contract conditions.113 Computer 
programmers used that language to enable computers to interact with and 
manipulate contracts, and when coupled with the proliferation of personal 
computers throughout businesses, contract logic could be embedded and 
tracked throughout a firm’s operational chain.114 Eventually entire industries 
sought to standardize the way such programs structured and understood 
contracts so that firms could use EDI to communicate with each other.115 
Once contracts were rendered in computer-readable code, they could be 
dynamically modified based on the parties’ positions. For example, an EDI system 
 
110 See Charles F. Goldfarb, The Roots of SGML—A Personal Recollection, SGML SOURCE 
(1996), http://www.sgmlsource.com/history/roots.htm [https://perma.cc/CX29-QEJN] (discussing 
the history of Standard General Markup Language and its role in contract simplification and 
integration with information systems). 
111 The computer was an IBM 1130. Id. An iPhone 7 Plus has three gigabytes of RAM, 
approximately 375,000 times as much RAM as in an IBM 1130. A computer capable of efficiently 
mining Bitcoin typically has four gigabytes of RAM. 
112 See id. 
113 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Language, Deals, and Standards: The Future of XML Contracts, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 313, 320-21 (2006) (describing “[s]oftware programmed to . . . recognize . . . 
tags [like] price and quantity”). For a discussion of how structured computer-readable code contrasts 
with traditional semantic contracts, see Surden, supra note 2, at 648-50. 
114 See Cunningham, supra note 113, at 320 (noting that EDI systems could “direct [a] computer 
to perform prescribed functions . . . [like] posting or accepting offers on those terms and confirming 
resulting contracts via email.”); see also WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 9-10 (noting that “unlike data on 
or in paper, fax, telex or e-mail, which can only be read by humans and must be rekeyed” into a firm’s 
various software systems, “a computer receiving an EDI purchase order can understand that the 
message is an order . . . without human intervention, [the EDI system can] log the order into the 
recipient’s order-fulfillment, product-shipping, and accounting programs” autonomously). 
115 See Cunningham, supra note 113, at 321 (describing commercial efforts to deploy EDI, which 
“required significant financial investment in related infrastructure and standard-setting processes to 
promote compatibility”). By the early 1990s, 15,000 firms used EDI across thirty countries. 
WRIGHT, supra note 59, at xxvii, 22. 
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could help a buyer and a supplier maintain an ongoing contractual relationship, 
with quantities and prices determined dynamically.116 This system could also 
respond to contingencies under the contract that were specified in advance, such 
as late arrival of goods, defective goods, or late payment.117 “[I]n principle,” at least, 
an EDI system could automate the formation and execution of “all the other 
transactional parameters that people contract about . . . using computer programs 
that ‘negotiate’ with each other and enter into ‘agreements.’”118 The result was “a 
revolution” in commerce, in that the “supreme and ubiquitous” medium for 
forming agreements—paper—would finally be eliminated.119 
B. Business Processes as Computer Code 
Forcing business relationships through the precise logic of computer code 
would also reduce firms’ economic and business risks. According to 
proponents, the specificity of EDI commands—grounded in fully-articulated 
“if-then” rules—would eliminate transactional ambiguities that tend to cause 
litigation.120 Product availability and descriptions were standardized, 
continually updated, and always accurate.121 This minimized transaction costs 
by lowering the amount of resources firms had to spend to find each other, 
understand product specifications, and confirm sales.122 
Commentators also imagined that EDI could have beneficial effects on 
decisionmaking in general. Requiring managers to fully specify contract logic 
ex ante would force them to consider potential deals more critically. 
Accordingly firms could avoid “unprofitable” contracts and minimize their 
need to opportunistically breach.123 The ability to enforce a chain of command 
through user permissions in computer systems would clarify which managers 
in a firm had final authority to approve and execute a contract, avoiding 
 
116 See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 
1131 (2000) (noting that EDI could be deployed to intelligently order “supplies that are routinely 
needed at certain points in a [production] process”). 
117 See id. (noting that EDI systems, rather than contracts between parties, have been used to 
manage events like late delivery or defective shipments). 
118 Id. 
119 WRIGHT, supra note 59, at xxvi. 
120 See Jane Winn, The Impact of XML on Contract Law and Contract Litigation, 5 (Nov. 17, 2005), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.101.7055&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E59A-XY9V] (arguing that EDI enabled “[s]tandardization and machine 
execution” which resulted in “lower than average litigation rates” by “enhanc[ing] the effectiveness 
of business contracting processes”). 
121 See WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 22-23 (noting that EDI replaced invoicing and the “paper 
model” of inventory management altogether). 
122 See Gillette, supra note 83, at 1431 (noting that EDI “breaks down geographical, language, and 
institutional obstacles that impede the formation of what would otherwise be efficient contracts”). 
123 See Winn, supra note 120, at 5 (noting that EDI forced businesses to “specify[] in advance” 
the prices at which they would and would not execute an agreement). 
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another potential source of litigation.124 More broadly, replacing human 
decisionmaking with “machine processes” would eliminate human error and 
“increase the rationality of [the] business.”125 
As ultimate proof of EDI’s success, commentators observe that “no 
litigation concerning EDI-formed contracts occurred” in the technology’s 
forty-year history.126 One explanation is that EDI’s technological features—
those that improved the contracting process, and those that affected firm 
operations in general—forced firms to fully commit to transactions in 
advance, and reduced ambiguities wherever possible.127 
C. Computer Code as Human Decisionmaking 
However, another explanation is that EDI systems enabled firms to 
flexibly rely on their existing business relationships.128 EDI systems were 
easily modifiable, but expensive and formed bilaterally with other firms.129 
Hence they were built out of a preexisting “relationship of trust” but could 
be adjusted as the parties’ relationship changed.130 These features enabled 
EDI systems to approximate the role of semantic and enforcement flexibility 
in traditional written contracts. 
 
124 See id. (stating that “compliance with management policies could be enforced more 
effectively” using EDI than in the traditional contracting process); see also Szabo, supra note 2 
(noting that smart contracts will enable firms to “convert[] many implicit employee contracts to 
more explicit smart contracts based on more direct relationships between owners (or at least their 
directors) and employees, and symmetric formalizations between employees”). 
125 Winn, supra note 120, at 5. 
126 Cunningham, supra note 113, at 321 (“In EDI’s four-decade history, no litigation concerning 
EDI-formed contracts occurred.”); see also Winn, supra note 120, at 5 (“Given the large volume of 
[business-to-business] EDI contracts formed in the U.S., it is surprising that there is not a single 
reported case involving an EDI contract.”). 
127 Winn, supra note 120, at 5-6 (reviewing the argument that EDI’s features have enabled 
business processes to become “more formally rational”). 
128 See id. at 6-7 (arguing that the lack of EDI-related litigation is due not only to improved process 
accuracy, but also greater ability to engage in informal conflict resolution and high incentives to do so). 
129 Id. Most EDI systems were formed bilaterally between firms. WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 11 
(“EDI can travel directly between the sender’s and receiver’s computers . . . via (1) the physical delivery of 
a computer tape containing the data . . . or (2) a link through the telephone or some other 
telecommunications system.”). For an example of bilateral EDI in the healthcare billing context, see id. at 
23 (describing an EDI system created by Baxter Healthcare Corporation, in which counterparties had to 
install specially-designed computers “that were connected only with [Baxter’s] order entry system”). 
Interestingly, there was a push in certain industries to create open EDI standards that would generate 
economies of scale. See id. at 10-11 (“Large industry committees set public EDI standards . . . . [Public] 
[s]tandards setting is a slow, expensive, bureaucratic process . . . . An industry group, such as the 
Automotive Industry Action Group, may [accordingly] develop guidelines for EDI implementation within 
its [own] industry.”). In a certain sense, this same debate is being replayed in the context of permissioned 
versus permissionless blockchains. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
130 Winn, supra note 120, at 6. 
290 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 263 
Modification of EDI systems was cheap and could dynamically incorporate 
contractual or relationship changes. Managers directly involved in business 
processes, not “judges or . . . attorneys,” were the key transactional decisionmakers. 
EDI freed managers from “the luxury (or as some would say, misfortune) of a 
hovering lawyer.”131 Instead, managers were empowered to continually optimize 
contract terms or to make relationship-preserving concessions.132 
Not only did EDI enable counterparties to harness their business 
relationship in contract creation—it actually encouraged them to do so. 
Parties were reluctant to invest in costly EDI systems without commitments 
from their counterparties to participate in those systems.133 EDI was also not 
easily interoperable from business to business, so such investments were 
highly relationship-specific and required familiarity with technical aspects of 
counterparties’ other information systems.134 High investment costs reduced 
the threat that parties would defect from the cooperative EDI trading 
arrangement and resort to litigation instead. If a party did choose to litigate, 
it would have to write off the cost of its EDI investment and terminate the 
business relationship with its counterparty. These disincentives were 
especially steep when an EDI system connected a powerful party with a 
weaker party, which characterized many EDI arrangements.135 
In this sense, EDI was successful because it harnessed the same types of 
flexibility that are so important to traditional, semantic contracts. EDI 
systems were easily modified and could replace as much or as little of parties’ 
existing, traditional contractual relationship as desired. It disincentivized 
litigation while providing ways to resolve business or transactional disputes 
cheaply and responsively.136 EDI’s strength was therefore not its precision or 
autonomy, but its lack thereof. Though EDI failed to fully replace “the paper 
model” for forming transactions, it made some related activities faster and 
 
131 WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 35. 
132 Winn, supra note 120, at 6 (noting that EDI trading partners operated within a “tacit agreement” 
to resolve disagreements or technical glitches); see also WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 35 (noting that “manager 
brain power” is a “supreme and irreplaceable” resource for designing and executing transactions). 
133 Winn, supra note 120, at 4 (“[I]t is relatively expensive to establish a [business-to-business] 
EDI system[], and businesses are reluctant to spend the money required to establish EDI 
communications in the absence of a relationship of trust that antedates the use of the technology.”). 
134 Id. at 6 (discussing the strategic impacts of relationship-specific investment in the context of EDI); 
see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing bilateral, private EDI systems). 
135 See Winn, supra note 120, at 5-7 (noting that EDI commonly connected small or medium 
sized businesses with large multinational corporations). 
136 See WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 323 (noting that EDI systems enable parties to speed up 
negotiations by providing focus on “a few key issues, that, if addressed . . . provide both parties a 
reasonable degree of certainty and fairness” on terms and conditions); see also Surden, supra note 2, at 
682 (noting that parties to electronic contracts “tolerat[e] a tradeoff in [ex-post] flexibility for [ex-ante] 
efficiency” since they can later rely on a “legal decision-maker” should an unplanned contingency occur). 
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more efficient.137 However, its most important contribution was empowering 
the human judgment of management decisionmakers. 
IV. INFLEXIBILITY IN SMART CONTRACTS 
EDI emerged when information technology was only beginning to saturate 
businesses, and when telecommunication was extremely limited. Conversely, 
smart contracts are being built in environments of full digitization, in which 
all aspects of firm operations, from production to payment to bookkeeping, 
are linked to digital systems. This technical sophistication creates the 
possibility of truly automated contract formation and execution. Paradoxically, 
it also makes smart contracting more expensive and less efficient than 
traditional semantic contracts in environments when there is ex post 
uncertainty, or where parties prefer to avoid drafting highly customized 
agreements. 
In this Part, I argue that these greater costs stem from three features of 
smart contracts: they must be written in precise, fully defined computer code; 
they are unmodifiable once executed; and they favor anonymous and one-off 
transactions. I anticipate responses to these critiques, reviewing some current 
events in blockchain politics. Finally, I argue that these limitations are not 
merely theoretical concerns. The lack of flexibility in smart contracts presents 
a major challenge to the technology’s scalability. 
A. Precision, Decentralization, and Anonymity Create Unique Costs 
Computer code must be precisely and completely defined, because at root it 
is a series of if–then instructions that must all be resolvable by a computer. A 
smart contract cannot contain a term that has one meaning at the time of 
execution and takes on another meaning later. Moreover, the only modifications 
that can be made to smart contracts are those that were built into the original 
contracts as dormant alternatives.138 Hence such modifications can only be made 
 
137 See WRIGHT, supra note 59, at 23 (“As experience [with EDI] grows further, users abandon 
the paper model. They electronically relay information . . . that would have been impractical to 
exchange on paper.”). In fact, EDI partners would frequently enter into EDI trading agreements—
traditional, semantic contracts that structured their use of EDI. Id. at 321. This is another example 
of parties using a paper contract to create an “interpretive regime” to govern the particular risks of 
their transaction, as in Part II. In this case, an EDI trading agreement could be used to avoid adverse 
outcomes under UCC § 2-207. See id. at 319-21 (noting that EDI users opted to use trading 
agreements to preclude the possible application of buyer-favored UCC gap-fillers). 
138 Bill Marino & Ari Juels, Setting Standards for Altering and Undoing Smart Contracts, in RULE 
TECHNOLOGIES: RESEARCH, TOOLS, AND APPLICATIONS, 151, 163 (Jose Julio Alferes et al. eds., 
2016) (explaining that smart contracts can be modified either by “turn[ing] ‘on’” terms that were 
“included in the initial contract in an ‘off ’ state” or by using “pointers” to “call out to . . . satellite 
contracts” created “at the outset” to represent “certain [alternative] function-terms”). A smart 
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if the parties explicitly contemplated at the outset that they might want to make 
those particular modifications later, and only if they are able to expend the 
resources required to negotiate and draft those modifications correctly. 
For example, suppose a vendor and a purchaser enter into an ordinary, 
written contract and develop a business relationship that they would both like 
to preserve. Then suppose at some point the vendor sends the customer low-
quality goods, and wants to compensate the customer by granting her a 60-
day extension on late payment. This payment flexibility was not included in 
the original written contract, because it would have been infeasible for the 
parties to negotiate ex ante about such a specific hypothetical situation. But, 
if the parties now wish to modify their original agreement, they can expend 
the modest resources required to negotiate and execute that change in 
writing. And if modifying the written agreement is too time-consuming and 
expensive, the parties can achieve the benefits of such a modification simply 
by agreeing verbally and implementing the change, leveraging their ongoing 
business relationship as a source of trust. 
This flexibility would not have been an option if the agreement were a smart 
contract. To defer payment for sixty days, the parties would need to draft a whole 
new smart contract incorporating the change. Even if the new negotiation is 
only focused on a single sixty-day extension, it necessarily raises new bargaining 
points, like what happens if there is another low-quality shipment. Perhaps the 
parties could have minimized these costs by including a renegotiation feature in 
the initial smart contract. But this solution simply shifts the costs of 
modification from mid-performance to the drafting stage.139 These costs are 
 
contract that attempts to call on a second contract chosen during execution results in a non-
deterministic function. See Erik Zhang & Da Hongfei, Reconstructing Smart Contracts Part I. The 
Ghost of Undeterminism, MERKLE (Mar. 24, 2017), https://themerkle.com/reconstructing-smart-
contracts-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/TU5S-DJEE] (“Dynamic Calls refer to a situation in which a 
program calls a second program, which can only be determined when running. Since the call target 
of a Dynamic Call is only decided when running, its actions are rendered un-deterministic.”). Non-
deterministic smart contracts are not technically viable. 
139 See Michael del Castillo, Donald Trump’s Transition is a Trial Run for Smart Contracts, 
COINDESK (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-builders-can-thrive-donald-
trumps-america/ [https://perma.cc/QSL2-6T8M] (arguing that unmodifiable smart contracts are 
“like programs without safety checks combined with contracts without arbitration clauses . . . . Your 
code will go wrong, your organization will run in ways you did not anticipate, your money will get 
lost, and you’ll have absolutely no recourse.”); Christopher D. Clack et al., Smart Contract 
Templates: Foundations, Design Landscape, and Research Directions, 4 (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.00771 [https://perma.cc/CDC7-GNQH] (“[I]t is common for provisions 
of an agreement to be varied dynamically—for example, to permit a favoured client to defer paying 
interest . . . . Unless every possible variation is coded in advance, none of this would be possible in 
a tamper-proof [smart contract] system.”); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 11, at 17 (“Blockchain 
transactions are irrevocable. There is no technical means, short of undermining the integrity of the 
entire system, to unwind a transfer. It is, however, possible to [program] various forms of exceptions 
or conditions . . . . Such flexibility, however, has to be coded into the smart contract [at] the outset 
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necessarily lower for parties to a semantic contract, who do not have to explicitly 
draft the option at all—either in advance or during performance.140 
Performance standards present further difficulties by creating a logical gap 
or undefined term in the contract. A term like “commercial reasonableness” 
will mean different things to different parties, in different transactions, at 
different times. As described above, sophisticated parties can use textual tools 
to imbue standards with meanings that are unique to the contract’s specific 
transactional context.141 This is important given the way that blockchain relies 
 
. . . .”). Interestingly, even when commenters address the flexibility question head on, they limit 
their analysis to the ex ante inclusion of a renegotiation function. See Elaine Ou, Smart Contracts 
Don’t Have to be Dumb, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2016-10-21/smart-contracts-don-t-have-to-be-dumb [https://perma.cc/X94Q-AQ5C].  
There are additional costs rooted in technical features of smart contracts. Parties to a smart 
contract pay a transaction fee to incentivize the network to process their contract code. In Ethereum, 
parties who wish to execute a smart contract must attach a bounty to the operation paid in “gas,” 
which is essentially a very small amount of Ether. Nodes on the Ethereum network are free to ignore 
proposed operations that are insufficiently funded. This supply and demand dynamic also helps 
police buggy or infinitely recursive code, forcing parties to internalize the cost of using valuable 
network resources. See DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 206-10. Parties to a smart contract will have to 
pay gas to call its modification function or to re-execute the contract with a modified term. 
140 See Cimino, supra note 19, at 114 (noting that sole reliance on written contract terms, 
without any informal norms of cooperation, only lowers transaction costs when the “exchange 
involve[s] a low level of transactional uncertainty”). 
141 See supra Part II; see also Surden, supra note 2, at 683 (noting that parties “may sometimes 
specify contract terms at a high level of generality to allow for flexibility and discretion . . . [b]ecause 
the computable approach involves automated comparisons . . . [it is inapt] if a scenario requires 
abstraction, ex-post flexibility in assessing facts, or the exercise of professional judgment”).  
Ironically, a good demonstration of this concept comes from current events in the blockchain 
industry. Ripple Labs Inc. v. R3 LRC LLC is a lawsuit and countersuit about a breached option 
contract and failure to “negotiate in good faith” over details of a commercial partnership. Complaint 
at 7, Ripple Labs Inc. v. R3 LRC LLC, No. CGC-17-561205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2017). Ripple is 
a blockchain product that provides interbank settlement and currency exchange services. Its 
blockchain is supported by a currency called XRP, which serves as a medium for currency exchange 
and can be bought and sold by retail investors on cryptocurrency exchanges. R3 is a software 
consortium developing blockchain products for use by financial services companies.  
As a new, disruptive entrant to the interbank payment industry, Ripple needed R3’s help in designing 
its product, setting up demos for potential customers, and forming relationships in the industry. R3 
promised to put “XRP on the map.” Id. at 5. The parties entered into a Technology Partnership Agreement, 
in which R3 agreed to help Ripple “manag[e] the Project” and negotiate for a term sheet governing the 
parties’ longer-term commercial relationship. Id. at 7. In exchange, R3 would receive a 15% revenue share 
from any customers it provided, as well as an option to buy 5 billion XRP tokens with an exercise price of 
$0.0085 per token until September 2019. Anna Irrera, U.S. Blockchain Startups R3 and Ripple in Legal Battle, 
REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-r3-ripple-lawsuit/u-s-blockchain-
startups-r3-and-ripple-in-legal-battle-idUSKCN1BJ27I (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).  
Since executing the Agreement, the price of XRP has skyrocketed to $0.20 per token, making 
the option contract worth over $1 billion. Ripple argues today that R3 breached the Agreement by 
failing to negotiate over a term sheet, and making insufficient efforts at helping to grow Ripple. 
Complaint at 8-9, Ripple Labs Inc. v. R3 LRC LLC, No. CGC-17-561205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 
2017). It seeks rescission of the option contract, plus damages for a variety of misrepresentation and 
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on decentralized technology, spreading control of a contract across many 
nodes.142 Storage and execution using a blockchain makes smart contracts 
secure and provides a natural check against bad-faith manipulation of contract 
terms. But this decentralization also prevents a contract from executing until 
nodes agree that its conditions have been satisfied. Thus, when a smart 
contract fails to consistently “produce[] the same output on the basis of a 
given input” across all participants in the system, it won’t be executed at all.143 
 
fraud claims. Id. at 14-19. R3, in its suit against Ripple, argues that the options contract lacks any 
unilateral termination provision and that it therefore must be enforced. Id. at 8-9.  
Some commenters have wondered why Ripple and R3—two parties at the forefront of 
blockchain development—did not construct a smart contract to govern their relationship. See Elaine 
Ou, R3 Should Have Used a Smart Contract, ELAINE’S IDLE MIND (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://elaineou.com/2017/09/10/r3-should-have-used-a-smart-contract/ [https://perma.cc/8MQT-
DUUU]. R3 in particular is a very public champion of introducing smart contracts to the financial 
services industry. Id. A smart contract would have enabled R3 to instantaneously exercise its option 
at its discretion, avoiding the time and expense of litigation. Presumably the two parties could have 
constructed a smart contract that captured the economics of their agreement, while generating 
publicity about the usefulness of the technology. 
The fact that the parties did not illustrates this Comment’s core themes. First, the parties were 
transacting in an extremely volatile environment. Part of the consideration being paid was in the 
form of XRP tokens. Though the parties both expected the currency to appreciate based on the 
success of Ripple’s products, they likely had very different guesses about where it would land. 
Drafting a smart contract with the potential to instantaneously provide unlimited upside to one 
party would create enormous ex ante drafting and negotiation costs. It is almost unthinkable that 
Ripple would enter into such an agreement at all unless it could formally define every aspect of R3’s 
obligations, and then to design contingencies for every way R3 might breach.  
In this case, R3’s obligations were necessarily vague. It was not bound to actually form a term 
sheet with Ripple—it was obligated to negotiate “in good faith.” The precise meaning of that phrase 
depends on the parties’ relationship and the unique context of the transaction. See supra notes 74–
83 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979) (“A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following . . . have 
been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and 
slacking off, [and] willful rendering of imperfect performance.”). Good faith is not a contractual 
provision that can be effectively translated into computer code.  
The confluence of these conditions—inability to approximate about the ex post world of the 
contract, and inability to precisely and discretely define performance—makes it impossible to use a 
smart contract (regardless of whatever blockchain enthusiasm the parties may share).   
142 Again, this argument applies to smart contracts in a fully permissionless blockchain like 
Ethereum. As a blockchain moves closer to the permissioned side of the spectrum—relying more on 
off-chain identity and traditional legal contracts—agreements can be built with more flexibility. See 
supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
143 Zhang & Hongfei, supra note 138; see also Hernández, supra note 13 (noting that a smart 
contract with subjective features would violate the agreement’s “security and legitimacy”). 
Theoretically, parties could design a smart contract allowing them to upload volumes of 
information about their industry, their past relationship, the meanings of certain commercial terms, 
and other details. This would approximate the kind of commercial context examined by courts in 
settling the meaning of ambiguous terms. By including enough such information, parties could 
minimize the risk that nodes in the network come to different conclusions about the same underlying 
behavior. However, this solution would be prohibitively expensive from a transaction fee 
perspective—the more extensively a smart contract uses network resources, the more its parties must 
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Requiring that parties’ “interpretive regime” be communicable and legible to 
any number of external agents would be prohibitively expensive from a 
drafting standpoint.144 Such a suggestion ignores why standards exist and how 
they are used to manage costs of contract formation.145 
Smart contracts also favor anonymity. The technology’s proponents worry 
that too much information about counterparty identity can pressure parties to 
accept worse terms from more powerful trading partners.146 In the words of one 
commentator, “[t]he value add of blockchain is the whole anonymous world.”147 
However, such anonymity also forecloses on the beneficial aspects of 
relationship–driven contracting.148 Negotiation costs are lower when parties 
can imply, rather than explicitly define, shared trading customs.149 And business 
 
pay the network to execute the contract. In the Ethereum context, Diedrich notes that this 
supply/demand dynamic makes the network ill-suited to execute the “business logic of a . . . complex 
system.” DIEDRICH, supra note 20, at 210. For an overview of how parties pay to execute their smart 
contracts in Ethereum, see supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (explaining that parties can construct an 
“interpretive regime” molded to the unique risks of their transaction). 
145 Literature on non-blockchain electronic contracts does suggest some ways to approximate 
the flexibility provided by standards in computer code. For example, Harry Surden proposes the 
concept of a “threshold agreement”—a traditional semantic master agreement dictating the terms of 
electronically-effected transactions. Surden, supra note 2, at 651. This solution is confirmation of the 
underlying problem: absent such an agreement, there is no way to evidence “the parties’ mutual 
understandings and goals.” Id. Parties could instead turn to industry-defined standards and provide 
only minimal semantic specification in their specific agreement. See id. at 652-53 (explaining the 
efficiency of this method and listing benefits). However, the decentralized nature of blockchain 
makes such standardization much more difficult. See infra Section IV.B. Finally, Surden suggests the 
use of standardized contracting graphical interfaces to constrain the types of terms parties may use. 
Surden, supra note 2, at 654. This would render the Turing-completeness of Ethereum moot. See 
supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
146 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 257-62 (noting the impact of automatic 
smart-contract execution on making agreement concessions); Hernández, supra note 13 (“Ideally you 
want all the information triggers to be clean and objective and not prone to a centralized party that 
you have to . . . trust . . . . That’s part of the blockchain, having people who don’t know . . . [or] trust 
each other [enter into transactions].” (quotation marks omitted)); Szabo, supra note 2 (discussing 
the concept of privity and its relationship to anonymity in smart contracts and noting that the 
contents of a contract should be shared only to the extent necessary to ensure performance). 
147 Hernández, supra note 13 (noting that “the level of technological sophistication [provided 
by blockchain] could be overkill” when contracting with familiar parties). 
148 The transaction history shared by two trading partners is a strategic asset, just like factories 
or equipment. As their transaction history grows, the parties develop “specialized information, 
language, and know-how,” improving communication, the quality of contract performance, and the 
chances of success in the market. See Jeffrey H. Dyer & Harbir Singh, The Relational View: 
Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
660, 662 (1998) (discussing “three types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset 
specific, and (3) human asset specificity”).   
149 In fact, research suggests that trust enables parties to progressively move from highly-
defined, formal contracts to more informal arrangements over time. See Cimino, supra note 19, at 117 
(describing a study that found that “preexisting trust was sufficiently effective at lowering 
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relationships provide a flexible and responsive backbone to transactions, 
encouraging parties to avoid litigation and preserve the promise of future trade. 
Empirical work in this area suggests that only parties with a strong preexisting 
trust would agree to the tight interconnection created by a smart contract.150 
This research confirms a perhaps intuitive argument that firms must be 
confident in their counterparty’s respect for norms such as “flexibility, 
information exchange, and solidarity” before agreeing to connect to each 
other’s production and payment systems using a smart contract.151 
Next, I anticipate and respond to arguments that smart contract proponents 
are likely to offer. First, some of blockchain’s most radical proponents envision 
smart contracts as reshaping the very nature of commercial organizations. I 
argue that even in a world full of smart contracting, parties will likely face 
transaction costs and pressures to increase the scale and scope of their 
agreements, and hence will need to deploy flexible, semantically-defined 
contracts. Second, I respond to claims about the open source nature of smart 
contracts. While open source development has benefits, it also has drawbacks 
in the context of agreement formation. The decentralized nature of smart 
contracting requires that new protocols be voluntarily adopted by users, 
creating uncertainty and resulting in suboptimal governance decisions. Lastly, 
smart contract proponents might point to decentralized dispute resolution 
processes already deployed by some blockchain services. I argue that these 
replicate the function of traditional common law courts, but without the 
efficiencies created by courts’ use of stable interpretation rules. 
B. Smart Contracts Cannot Create a Transaction-Costless Environment 
Taken to a logical extreme, smart contracting will transform the very 
nature of the firm. One of the firm’s core purposes is to lower transaction costs 
by performing tasks internally instead of contracting externally.152 But if smart 
contracts enable transactions to be designed cheaply, executed immediately, 
and performed accurately—based on precisely defined, fully rational computer 
code—transactions can be broken up into smaller and smaller pieces.153 For 
 
transaction costs of subsequent deals that parties could, essentially, afford to use a less complex, 
more discrete-looking contract form”). 
150 Id. at 109-114 (reviewing empirical research and arguing that “firms’ commitments to . . . 
relational norms [of flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity] probably made the transaction 
possible in the first place, as well as more efficient in the end”). 
151 Id. at 111. 
152 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 178 
(2002) (“[T]he . . . structure [of the firm] arises mainly in the service of economizing on transaction costs.”). 
153 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 121 (“When aggregated, smart contracts can 
make firms resemble networks, rendering corporate boundaries more porous and fluid.”). But see 
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example, Tapscott and Tapscott argue that smart contracts will enable 
companies to craft “clever, self-enforcing” agreements at “very low cost,” 
reducing search and coordination costs.154 In this world, there is no need for 
long-term commercial relationships or huge deals with complex logic. 
Companies will “disaggregate into more effective networks.”155 A producer or 
a service-provider will function as a kind of independent contractor, entering 
into rapid micro-transactions with counterparties on a one-off basis. Markets 
will connect anonymous sellers to anonymous buyers, and purchasing 
decisions will be made based on digital reputation.156 As transaction costs 
shrink to zero, so will the need for firms. Arguing that semantic contracts are 
important for firms, therefore, ignores that the most beneficial effect of smart 
contracting is also its most revolutionary—a transformation in the nature of 
the firm itself. 
However, this argument confuses cause and effect. Firm size and contract 
complexity are both responses to costs that are inherent in the formation of 
commercial agreements.157 These costs include finding trading partners and 
making that search easier through advertising; designing, drafting, and 
negotiating agreements; and monitoring to ensure faithful performance of 
the agreement. The smaller the firm, the more intensely those costs are felt.158 
Likewise, the simpler the agreement, the more likely it will have to undergo 
expensive renegotiation.159 Hence there is a natural economic limit on how 
small firms can ultimately shrink. 
Smart contracts may indeed lower some of these costs, but they will raise 
others. Tapscott and Tapscott observe that lower costs of “monitoring [and] 
enforcing” a smart contract are offset by higher “up front” costs of 
 
Levy, supra note 11, at 10 (“[Smart] contracts thus impose a degree of inflexibility on contractors’ 
relations that might short-circuit a number of alternative uses to which law is put.”). 
154 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 121, 142. 
155 Id. at 121. 
156 Id. at 122. 
157 Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 
123 (1988) (“[W]here transaction costs are zero . . . the parties can write a comprehensive contract. 
As Coase [and] Williamson . . . have emphasized, however, this is very unrealistic: in practice, 
transaction costs are pervasive and large . . . . [P]arties will not write a contract that anticipates all 
the events that may occur.”). Firms may encounter diseconomies of scale beyond a certain size. 
Williamson observes that large, aggregated firms deploy inefficient incentives and unnecessarily 
intense administrative controls. TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 121. 
158 See Bart Nooteboom, Firm Size Effects on Transaction Costs, 5 SMALL BUS. ECON. 283, 288 (1993) 
(discussing the “threshold costs” involved in the formation of agreements, which “arise regardless of the size 
of transaction” and thus affect smaller firms more than larger ones). 
159 See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting 5-6 (John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Stud. L., Econ., and Pub. Pol’y Working Papers, Paper No. 264, 2001), http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=lepp_papers (noting that 
simple agreements are often rendered “suboptimal” by the emergence of new information, requiring 
the parties to renegotiate). 
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“determining agreement terms.”160 Further, these costs are likely to overlap. 
For example, a service contract built without the use of semantic contract 
standards would require both a highly-precise (and likely inaccurate) ex ante 
definition of adequate performance and extensive monitoring to ensure the 
agent’s honest, faithful performance.161 A contract with both features, 
however, would be expensive to draft and impractical to deploy. And more 
broadly, trading lower ex post monitoring costs for much higher ex ante 
negotiation costs will only make sense for the simplest agreements. 
Though the size or concentration of firms may decrease in response to 
lower transaction costs, those costs can never disappear completely, and 
neither will firms. More likely, trading partners will apply smart contracts to 
certain pieces of their transaction, but will retain traditional semantic 
agreements to structure their broader relationships.162 The need to loosely but 
reliably define performance, and the pressure to construct larger and longer-
term agreements that can change flexibly in response to unpredictable events, 
will exist even in a world of smart contracts. 
C. Open-Source Development is Efficient in Some Contexts  
but Not in Contract Creation 
Second, smart contract proponents might highlight the efficiency of 
creating agreements in an open source, collaborative way. The success of 
open-source software communities is well documented.163 Proponents argue 
that trading partners who can’t afford sophisticated, expensive agreements—
or whose transactions are too small to justify the expense—should 
nonetheless have access to well-made contracts.164 Smart contracting may 
 
160 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 32, at 103. 
161 Indeed, any agreement for a good or service not easily transformed into blockchain 
information, for example through an internet-of-things-enabled device, would suffer from this 
problem. Whenever a human agent must manually transform physical data into digital bits, there is 
an opportunity for dishonest behavior and therefore a need for trust. 
162 Interestingly, this was the same approach advocated by the EDI commentators. See supra 
note 137 and accompanying text. Today, this is playing out in technical discussions about smart 
contract design. See, e.g., Lim et al., supra note 49 (“[T]here should be a dumb contract between the 
parties, in the form of a ‘legal wrapper’ which sets out terms of the contract which are not 
deterministic and not suitable for execution through the smart contract [such as] a ‘material adverse 
event’ [clause].”). Permissioned blockchains rely on a similar concept to structure the relationship 
of network participants in a legally cognizable way. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
163 See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Viral Open Source: Competition vs. Synergy, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 469, 470-72 (2012) (arguing that compared to proprietary alternatives, open-source frameworks 
are cheaper to use, create incentives for developers to offer their contributions for free, and result in 
more rapid innovation). 
164 See, e.g., Chris DeRose, Smart Contracts: Blockchain’s Solution for the Underserved, AM. BANKER 
(Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/smart-contracts-blockchains-solution-for-
the-underserved [https://perma.cc/R239-PHWT] (discussing how smart contracts may enable cheaper 
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help those entities replace their expensive and risky paper agreement with a 
tailored and autonomously-executed digital agreement. 
There are two counterarguments.165 First, consensus around an open-
source blockchain framework doesn’t exist yet, and there’s enormous debate 
about how those standards should develop.166 Open-source protocols for 
blockchain applications—such as those for Bitcoin—are frequently updated, 
but it’s up to individual users to implement those updated versions. These 
rounds of improvements, called “forks,” spark intense disagreement in the 
blockchain community because they represent a majority-rule approach to 
changing the rules of all contracts in the system.167 There is also competition 
among blockchain development companies serving similar functions, which 
 
escrow services and therefore expand access to the banking system); Josh Stark, Making Sense of 
Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK (June 4, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-
contracts/ [https://perma.cc/YJG4-UF7A] (noting that smart contracts are a cheaper, faster 
alternative to legal agreements and may open up “[n]ew markets”). 
165 A possible third argument is that smart contracting merely replaces the expense of hiring 
lawyers with the expense of hiring smart contract programmers. It’s not clear whether such a shift 
is net beneficial, especially considering the layers of added litigation expense and uncertainty that 
would accompany a transition to smart contracting. There is nothing about a contract regime run by 
programmers that’s especially democratizing compared to one run by lawyers. 
166 See Aaron van Widrum, Ethereum Classic Hard Forks; Diffuses ‘Difficulty Bomb,’ BITCOIN 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 13, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/ethereum-classic-hard-forks-diffuses-
difficulty-bomb-1484350622/ [https://perma.cc/QC3P-KDA5] (discussing Ethereum Classic users’ 
efforts to prevent a rapid increase in mining difficulty, which would have rendered the cryptocurrency 
useless). At the time of writing, Bitcoin users are also contemplating a fork to increase block size, which 
would allow for Bitcoin transactions to be processed more rapidly. See Kyle Torpey, Bitcoin’s Block Size 
Controversy is Morphing into a Debate Between Hard Forks and Soft Forks, COINJOURNAL (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://coinjournal.net/bitcoins-block-size-controversy-morphing-debate-hard-forks-soft-forks/ 
[https://perma.cc/LLC5-GZ5P] (“For nearly the past two years, various alternatives to Bitcoin Core 
have attempted to increase Bitcoin’s block size limit via hard-forking changes to the codebase run by 
nodes on the network . . . . A hard fork requires every economically-relevant Bitcoin full node (or at 
least nearly all of them) to upgrade to a new network.”). 
167 Interestingly, Ethereum Classic (also called “ETC”) was itself forked from Ethereum after the 
Ethereum community decided to reverse unauthorized trades. ETC users believe that permitting the 
reversal of undesirable transactions leads to the same political influence over money that makes fiat 
currency undesirable. See Aaron van Wirdum, Ethereum Classic Community Navigates a Distinct Path to 
the Future, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/ethereum-
classic-community-navigates-a-distinct-path-to-the-future-1471620464/ [https://perma.cc/572E-CK74] 
(“Ethereum Classic started off . . . as a protest movement, opposing a (perceived) bailout of Ethereum[] 
. . . . [T]he Ethereum Classic community [is committed to] immutability and censorship resistance 
[and believes Ethereum Classic embodies] the ‘code is law’ mantra, in which there is no room for forks 
whenever code doesn’t operate [as expected].”); see also Curtis Yarvin, The DAO As a Lesson in 
Decentralized Governance, URBIT (June 24, 2016), https://urbit.org/blog/dao/ [https://perma.cc/5Z6D-
5DMC] (applying political theory to the Ethereum Classic fork and characterizing the majority-rules 
approach to Ethereum governance as a “digital banana republic”). 
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needlessly raises the number of service providers users must consider as they 
choose among many similar options.168 
Second, forks are vulnerable to severe collective action problems, as the 
majority of users may not understand an objectively better protocol, or care 
enough to be effectively informed, causing them to make irrational governance 
decisions.169 Unsophisticated parties—the kinds of parties for whom smart 
contracting is to supposed to be most beneficial—will unlikely have much sway 
during a fork debate. Instead, fork decisions will be captured by the most 
prolific smart contract users—huge, commercially sophisticated companies 
engaging in large numbers of routine transactions. Banks, for example, are 
behind the most public efforts to drive blockchain adoption.170 This justifies 
some skepticism that smart contracting will be as radically democratic as its 
proponents claim. 
D. Blockchain-Based Dispute Resolution is Radically Uncertain Without Offering 
Any Advantage Over Traditional Contract Litigation 
Finally, it’s worth noting that blockchain-enabled dispute resolution 
systems are already in place. These procedures allow parties to respond to 
disputes without the need for litigation, and proponents might therefore 
argue that they mimic the role of flexibility in semantic contracts. For 
example, OpenBazaar, a peer-to-peer marketplace similar to eBay, relies on 
moderators to adjudicate disputes.171 Buyers can include a moderator on a 
 
168 See Rob Marvin, IBM, Microsoft Are Building Our Blockchain Future—And They’re Not Afraid to Butt 
Heads, PCMAG (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.pcmag.com/article/346729/ibm-microsoft-are-building-our-
blockchain-future-and-theyr [https://perma.cc/WQB7-QYNE] (noting that participants in the 
blockchain community—from established firms like IBM and Microsoft to “a potpourri of 
consortiums, alliances, and open-source initiatives”—are members of redundant, and sometimes 
conflicting, development projects).   
169 See Yarvin, supra note 167 (“But after the DAO hack, how does anyone trust any contract? 
Arguably, Ethereum is ready to be decentralized only when users are able to make this decision 
rationally, and get it right. This work simply hasn’t been done.”). One possible solution to this 
problem is to provide users with an incentive to make correct, or at least popular, governance 
decisions by directly tying such decisions to a cryptocurrency. See, e.g., Governance, TEZOS, 
https://www.tezos.com/governance (last visited Aug. 30, 2017) (describing a blockchain that permits 
users to propose protocol upgrades and provides rewards if those suggestions are implemented). 
170 See Hileman, supra note 16 (noting that one major smart contract consortium, R3CEV, added 
forty-two banks in 2016 and that sixty percent of its current participants are designated as global 
systemically important financial institutions by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision). 
171 See Sam Patterson, How Moderators and Dispute Resolution Work in OpenBazaar, OPENBAZAAR 
BLOG (Feb. 24, 2016), https://blog.openbazaar.org/how-moderators-and-dispute-resolution-work-in-
openbazaar/#.WPn6k1Pyuis [https://perma.cc/H5J3-WNJ8] (“[C]entralized ecommerce platforms [like 
eBay] . . . listen to disputes from a buyer or seller, make a decision . . . and then take action . . . . 
Since they control the platform directly, they have the power [to adjudicate the dispute]. This type 
of top-down, centralized dispute resolution on the platform isn’t possible with OpenBazaar, which 
has no central point of control.”). 
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transaction, which allows for reversibility of the transaction if the moderator 
agrees with the complainant.172 Moderators review the parties’ arguments and 
decide who has been wronged, triggering payment of the disputed funds.173 
The creator of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, has even suggested a decentralized 
court system to adjudicate disputes in exchange for a fee.174 Such courts would 
be especially useful for “determin[ing] the meaning of ‘reasonable.’”175 
However, the decentralized nature of these systems ensures that they will 
be essentially useless in managing the high costs of smart contracting. By 
shifting dispute resolution to an online system that relies on an ever-
changing, unpredictable, unaccountable, and opaque group of 
decisionmakers, decentralized adjudication cannot generate contract “public 
goods” like performance standards, which emerge through the stable 
application of interpretation rules by courts. For example, OpenBazaar’s 
system allows users to select their own moderators just like they would select 
a product to purchase on the site, based on each moderator’s fees and her 
ratings from previous users. But each moderator is free to decide her cases 
based on whatever substantive principles she prefers, which may or may not 
be evident from her listing.176 Likewise, Buterin’s proposal requires that 
judges are “randomly selected” and then incentivized to adjudicate honestly 
“by the threat of a larger ‘supreme court’ contradicting them,” resulting in 
forfeiture of their adjudication fee.177 
In these decentralized resolution systems, parties cannot know how to 
craft their arguments to maximize success or minimize risk. They cannot cite 
precedent to incorporate previous decisions, and may not even know what 
 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See Vitalik Buterin (vbuterin), Decentralized Court, REDDIT (Apr. 16, 2016), https://
www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4gigyd/decentralized_court/ [https://perma.cc/X9QC-3DRV] 
(proposing a “decentralized court” “by which a user could ask a question, expressed in the form of English 
text, and have a decentralized mechanism . . . determine the answer, and then send a callback and a log to 
the user who asked the question”). Another proposal is contained in TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 
32, at 104 (describing a system for designating in advance a “neutral, disinterested third-party 
arbitrator” to enable parties to complete transactions using smart contracts). 
175 See Buterin, supra note 176. 
176 See How to Choose a Good Moderator on OpenBazaar, OPENBAZAAR BLOG (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://blog.openbazaar.org/how-to-choose-a-good-moderator-on-openbazaar/ [https://perma.cc/RM2V-
WR35]. For a listing of OpenBazaar moderators, see Moderators, DUO, https://duosear.ch/moderators (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2017). A representative OpenBazaar moderator is @bitcoinmitchell, who charges a two 
percent moderation fee and is trusted by fourteen users. See @bitcoinmitchell, DUO, 
https://duosear.ch/@bitcoinmitchell (last visited Aug. 30, 2017). The user’s entire explanation of his 
moderation process is only four sentences long: “In the case of a dispute, both sides will present their 
evidence. Reasonable effort will be made towards a mutually agreed resolution. If no resolution can be 
agreed upon then the evidence will be weighed and a decision will be made. If it is not clear whom the 
rightful party is then funds will be split based on the assessment of the moderator.” Id. 
177 Buterin, supra note 174. 
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those previous decisions were. They cannot deploy performance standards 
because there’s no way to restrict the range of review used by randomly-
selected courts, which may or may not respect the wording of a particular 
merger clause or a preamble that restricts relevant commercial practice to a 
specific industry. As a result, decentralized adjudication will grow more 
resource-intensive over time as parties attempt, and inevitably fail, to define 
every contingency ex ante with the exacting rigor of computer code. In short, 
without the tools created for traditional contracts by traditional courts, 
parties will have to argue every dispute from scratch, and without any idea 
about how such disputes will be analyzed.178 
CONCLUSION 
There is no contract technology that fits every possible transaction. Instead, 
firms blend formal governance mechanisms with informal modifications, 
crafting commercial relationships that can withstand the unique pressures 
facing their business and industry. Smart contracts will offer meaningful 
improvements to contracting under certain conditions—for example, where 
there is low uncertainty or where performance monitoring would otherwise be 
especially expensive. Perhaps firms will deploy smart contracts in certain areas 
of their business or to manage a defined category of routine transactions. But 
we know today that firms consider contractual flexibility to be a crucial strategic 
issue.179 Smart contracts that fail to offer semantic and enforcement flexibility 
will be useful in a very limited set of circumstances. 
The impacts go beyond transaction costs. Fraudulent and unconscionable 
contract terms, traditionally policed by courts, would likely proliferate as 
“code-savvy parties” take advantage of the “code-naive.”180 Decentralized 
 
178 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 11, at 32 (assessing whether smart contracts “offer[] the 
possibility of making courts essentially obsolete—surpassed by mechanisms that can enforce obligations 
. . . with greater efficiency and customization”). A blockchain adjudication system might be able to 
capture the benefits provided by traditional courts. For example, it could deploy a stable pool of judges, 
require that opinions be published, and design incentives to reward decision convergence. All smart 
contracts executed in the system would be subject to redrafting or rescission by the system’s judges. 
This system would be an extreme example of permissioned blockchain and thus subject to the same 
vehement criticism by blockchain purists, such as concerns about security and corruption. 
At the same time, the more a decentralized system comes to look like a traditional court, the 
less advantage there is to smart contracts in the first place. Indeed, OpenBazaar’s dispute resolution 
system and traditional common-law courts are conceptually quite similar, except that the latter has 
had centuries to mature. 
179 See Cimino, supra note 19, at 111-115 (“Usually we think that express terms set out the parties’ 
economic expectations, while background relational expectations are merely informal grease for the 
wheel. But . . . research suggests that contractors see relational expectations as economic expectations.”).   
180 Marino & Juels, supra note 138, at 157 (claiming that “code-savvy parties . . . defraud[ing] or 
forc[ing] uncounscionable terms on code-naïve parties” would constitute “grounds for reformation”). 
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blockchain adjudicators would be unable to efficiently create doctrine around 
such fact-intensive questions. And though some proponents have envisioned 
smart contracts with special intervention functions for traditional courts, they 
presume that traditional judges will interpret smart contracts using 
traditional contract doctrine.181 Code fails to contain the interpretive richness 
conveyed by semantic language, and so intervening courts would be forced to 
essentially rebuild entire agreements from scratch. This is likely intolerable 
to both code-savvy and code-naive parties to a smart contract. 
These tradeoffs suggest that technology cannot replace what is 
fundamentally a human activity. Smart contracting certainly proposes 
exciting new changes to the way transactions might take place, and presents 
a meaningful step forward from the days of EDI. But a full-scale smart 
contracting revolution would introduce costs far more extreme and 
intractable than the ones it seeks to solve. Proponents who argue for a 
complete replacement of semantic contracts underestimate the power of fluid 
human behavior and judgment in the contracting process. The flexibility of 
semantic contracts is a feature, not a bug. 
 
181 E.g., id. at 155 (“Few feel confident reading ‘legalese’; even fewer feel confident reading 
code. In light of this, our first standard is a familiar one: when there is unilateral mistake—or when 
any of the other bases for Rescission by Court exist—and a court orders a smart contract rescinded, 
auto-performance must cease.”). 
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